

Annex:
Ballot Printer Protection Profile

1 Protection Profile for a Voting System Ballot Printer

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5 **VSBP-PP**

6 **Version Draft**

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94 **1 PP introduction**

95 **1.1 Introduction**

96 Based on the advice of the commission Electronic Voting at Polling Stations dedicated Protection
97 Profiles have been developed for two devices that can be used to support the voting process. Namely
98 these devices are the ballot printer and the vote counter. They can be used by the voter to make their
99 choice and print it on a ballot paper and to efficiently count the votes.

100 The current document represents the Protection Profile for the Ballot Printer.

101 In order to provide a global overview of the process, the current document contains information on

- 102 • The procedural view to voting and counting
- 103 • The life-cycle of the ballot printer
- 104 • Assets to be protected by the ballot printer
- 105 • Subjects that are interacting with the ballot printer
- 106 • Threats against the assets
- 107 • Organizational Security Policies to be fulfilled
- 108 • Assumptions that can be made about the intended environment

109 The whole content of the current document has been discussed and documented based on the
110 principles for voting These are as follows:

- 111 • Transparency
- 112 • Verifiability
- 113 • Integrity
- 114 • Eligibility to vote
- 115 • Freedom of vote
- 116 • Secrecy of the vote
- 117 • Equal suffrage
- 118 • Accessibility

119

120

121

122 **1.2 PP Reference**

Title: Protection Profile for a Voting System Ballot Printer

Contact:

Version: Draft

Authors:

Registration:

Certification-ID:

Evaluation Assurance Level: The assurance level for this PP is EAL 4 augmented.

CC-Version:

Keywords: Voting System, Ballot Printer

123 **1.3 Specific terms**

124 The following specific terms are used in the context of this document

Term	Description
Voter	In the context of this document, the voter is regarded as a person that is legitimated to participate in an election.
Choice	The choice of the voter is the primary asset of the ballot printer. The choice means, on the one hand the selection of a party and a candidate, or the answers to the question for a referendum, or a blank choice on the ballot printer (see figure 1).
Vote	From the moment the ballot paper is in the ballot box, in the context of this document it is regarded and described as vote.
Mode	Modes are dedicated life-phases where the TOE requires or offers interaction.

125

Table 1: Specific terms

126

127

128 **1.4 TOE Overview**

129 **1.4.1 Introduction**

130 The TOE defined in this Protection Profile is the ballot printer that can be used within an election
131 process. In the following chapters, the overall election process that is supported by the ballot printer is
132 described.

133 **1.4.2 Procedural Overview**

134 A simplified overview shows the process as follows: The voter comes to the polling station and
135 legitimates himself as a legitimate voter against the members of the electoral committee, e.g. by
136 presenting their voter card and their identity document. The members of the electoral committee admit
137 the voter to vote. For that the voter is given the possibility to make a vote choice with the ballot printer
138 and print that choice. After the voter has checked whether their choice has been printed correctly on
139 the ballot paper (every print on the paper shall be only plain text that is readable by everyone) the
140 voter puts their choice into a classical ballot box. In the moment where the choice is put into the ballot
141 box, it becomes a vote.

142 Once the voting has ended the count starts. In this phase the electoral committee performs several
143 actions including the counting of the votes deposited in the ballot box. Before opening the ballot box
144 the electoral committee shuts down the ballot printer so that this device cannot be used anymore in the
145 polling station. The ballot papers can then be counted with the vote counter. The vote counter prints
146 the result of the counting and this printout is then attached to the official report. The count phase ends
147 with drawing up an official report by the electoral committee.

148 It is important to understand that the procedure as it is described in this document differentiates
149 between the voter's choice and the vote. The choice in this context means, on the one hand the
150 selection of a party and a candidate on the ballot printer or the selection of an answer to a referendum
151 question or the selection for a blank vote, but also the printout itself until it is put into the ballot box
152 (see figure 1). Thus, this document always refers to the term "choice" to describe the voters' activities
153 until they put their ballot paper into the ballot box. From the moment the ballot paper has been put into
154 in the ballot box, in the context of this document it is regarded and described as a vote.

155 The paragraphs below provide a more detailed overview of the ballot printer and vote counter as well
156 as of the voting process at all.

157 The following figure summarizes the cooperation of the components from a high level perspective.

158




Figure 1: System overview


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160
161

162 1.4.3 Detailed overview

163 From a procedural perspective, it can be distinguished between the phases of voting and counting that
164 are described further within the following chapters.

165 1.4.3.1 Set up

166 Before the voting begins the ballot printer needs to be set up (see figure 2). This comprises the placing
167 in the polling station and the connection to electricity. A member of the electoral committee starts-up
168 the ballot printer. He/she shall legitimate and process the start-up by a digital token. The ballot printer
169 requires a self-test and the printout of one or more choices to see whether the ballot printer works
170 correctly. If the electoral committee decides that the ballot printer works correctly the ballot printer is
171 ready for use. The following diagram depicts the set up process of the ballot printer.



172
173

Figure 2: Start process for the ballot printer

174 1.4.3.2 Voting


175 On the day of the election, the polling station opens at the time that is defined by electoral laws. A
 176 voter that wants to vote, hands over their voter pass and shows a valid ID-document to the electoral
 177 committee. In case of multiple elections on the same day, the voter hands over a voter pass for each
 178 election the voter is entitled to vote for. The electoral committee checks the voter pass(es), checks if
 179 the voter pass is not on the list of invalid voter passes and checks based on the ID-document if the
 180 person that wants to vote is the rightful holder of the voter pass(es). If all these checks are successfully
 181 completed, the electoral committee gives the voter one or more tokens to activate the ballot printer to
 182 make a vote choice for the election(s) the voter is entitled to. The voter receives a token for each
 183 election the voter is entitled to cast a vote for. A voter can, in addition to his own vote, cast one or two
 184 proxy votes. The proxy votes may only be cast when the voter casts his own vote. For a proxy vote the
 185 voter must hand over the voter pass of the proxy giver. On the voter pass the proxy part must have
 186 been filled in completely and both proxy giver and proxy receiver must have signed the voter pass.
 187 The proxy receiver must also present a copy of an ID-document of the proxy giver. The voter shall
 188 present a token to the ballot printer. The ballot printer swallows the token so that the token can only be
 189 used once each time it is handed over to a voter by the electoral committee. The token will activate the
 190 ballot printer for the election the voter can make a choice for and guide the voter through the steps.

191 Once the voter has made his/hers choice, they will be asked to confirm their choice. In case that the

192 voter confirms their choice, the printer prints the choice on a ballot paper. In the case that the voter
 193 does not confirm the displayed choice, the voter can go back in the selection process. After the choice
 194 of the voter has been printed the choice made by the voter is deleted from memory.

195 The voter withdraws the printed ballot paper from the ballot printer and puts the ballot paper in the
 196 ballot box. The following diagram depicts the voting procedure.

197



198


199

Figure 3: Voting process

200 Tokens can be re-used by the electoral committee for next voters. To re-use tokens the electoral

201 committee can collect the tokens that have been swallowed by the ballot printer.

202 To terminate the voting process, the electoral committee shuts down the ballot printer.



203

204


Figure 4: Shut-down of the ballot printer

205 1.4.3.3 Counting

206 The voter counter shall be started by a token. The vote counter shall request the number of the polling
 207 station or of the ballot box to be entered or a previously set number to be confirmed before it performs
 208 its self-test and enters the mode that allows the beginning of the counting process.

209 During the counting process, for each scanned ballot paper where the vote is recognized the vote
 210 counter shall print a consecutive number on the ballot paper. Furthermore it shall save the recognized
 211 vote and printed number of every single ballot paper to its log file. When the ballot papers of a ballot
 212 box have been put through the vote counter the person that is allowed to operate the vote counter shall
 213 confirm this. The counter generates a result of the ballot papers that have been counted and a result
 214 (the number of) of the ballot papers that have been rejected because they could not be counted. The
 215 results can be printed on paper and can be stored on a digital token. The electoral committee will judge
 216 the ballot papers that have been rejected by the vote counter. In the case that the vote counter was able
 217 to recognize the vote on the ballot paper and that the consecutive number has been printed, the vote
 218 counter shall put this paper in an output tray for successfully counted ballot papers. It shall not put
 219 successfully counted ballot papers into a tray for ballot papers that caused problems during the
 220 scanning process. The other way round, the counter shall put votes that could not be counted into a
 221 tray for those papers and shall not put them into a tray for successfully counted votes. The following
 222 diagram depicts the process of counting.

223



224
225

Figure 5: Counting the votes

226 1.4.4 TOE type

227 The TOE described in this PP is a printer (ballot printer) that is used to print ballot papers within an
228 election process.


229 1.4.5 TOE physical scope

230 The physical scope of the TOE comprises the hard- and software that is relevant for the functionality:

- 231 • **Casing of the Device:** The casing of the ballot printer needs a mechanism to protect the
232 device from intrusion. The ballot printer and the vote counter may consist of more than one
233 part. In that case each part shall have its own casing that protects it from intrusion¹.
- 234 • **Interface(s) for token:** The TOE provides one or more interfaces that are used for token based
235 role holder authentication.
- 236 • **Interface(s) for data transfer:** The TOE provides one or more interfaces that are used for
237 data import and export (election data, token data, configuration data, log-file).
- 238 • **Interface(s) for user-interaction:** The TOE presents activated users the set of interactions
239 they are allowed to perform and guides the user through the process.
- 240 • **Security Module:** The TOE includes a security module that shall be used as a cryptographic
241 service provider (it provides key generation, key destruction if required and signature
242 generation)².
- 243 • **Printing part:** The TOE provides a feed through mechanism that feeds special ballot papers to
244 the printing unit. Furthermore it provides a printing unit to print the ballot paper.

¹ Some of the requirements in this Protection Profile are dedicated to the case that the TOE may comprise more than one physical part/unit.

² The functionality of hashing and signature verification is however provided by the TOE itself.



245
246

Figure 6: TOE physical scope

247 Although built into the TOE, the security module itself shall not be part of the TOE. For security
248 modules standard Protection Profiles exist and CC practise is to re-use these and extend them with the
249 additional features and the evaluation level needed. This means that a security module is built in the
250 casing of the TOE and is internally connected to the TOE, but has to be evaluated separately and not in
251 the context of the evaluation of the ballot printer. This kind of illustration has been chosen to point out
252 that the security module shall be an internal component that is placed within the casing of the TOE.
253 The security module shall be evaluated according to [PP_SM].

254

255 1.4.6 TOE logical scope

256 The logical scope of this TOE can be defined by its security functions:

- 257 • **Token authentication and activation:** The TOE is able to authenticate presented token, match
258 token to a defined role and activate dedicated role functionality.
- 259 • **Protection of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality:** Within the whole process, the TOE
260 is able to protect user data in terms of integrity, authenticity and confidentiality.
- 261 • **Cryptography** that allows the **verification of signatures** on data to be imported by the TOE
262 and **signing of data**, that can be exported.
- 263 • **Management:** The TOE provides the functionality to manage on the one hand the data that is
264 used for the operation of the TOE (election data) and on the other hand security related data
265 (log-file access, configuration, token management).
- 266 • **Auditing:** The TOE audits and stores defined events and provide the functionality to export
267 the audit logs and to delete them.


- 268
- 269
- 270
- 271
- 272
- 273
- **Self-Protection:** The TOE shall be able to detect whether its hard- or software has been manipulated. In the case that the self-protection mechanism detects an intruder, it shall notify users and switch to a secure state.
 - **Self-Test:** The TOE is able to perform a self-test to check, whether the TOE works as specified and allow authorized users to verify the integrity of data, software and hardware.

274 The TOE uses cryptography that allows the verification of signatures to verify imported data and
 275 signing of data to secure exported data. The signing of data is provided by a security module, hence it
 276 is not a part of the logical scope of the TOE. See paragraph 1.4.5.

277

278 1.4.7 TOE Life-cycle

279 The following figure shows the life cycle phases for the ballot printer.



280

281

Figure 7: Life cycle for the devices

Life Cycle Phase	Description
Specification	During the specification-phase, the public authority that is responsible specifies the requirements that the ballot printer shall fulfill. This includes the development of the Protection Profiles for the ballot printer.
Development	Based on the specification, the manufacturer is responsible for the development of the ballot printer in a way that it matches the requirements of the specification. Thus, this phase begins when a manufacturer is awarded the contract for the development and ends when TOE samples have been successfully released. Additionally, the ballot printer returns from other phases back into the development, when the specification has changed and the manufacturer needs to update the devices.
Certification	This phase comprises the evaluation of the TOE samples by an evaluation body for Common Criteria and the certificated by a certification authority .
Production	After the certification of the TOE samples, the production of the ballot printer starts. The manufacturer shall ensure that compared to the TOE samples no component of ballot printer is changed in any way whatsoever during the whole process of production.
Qualification	The qualification of every produced ballot printer by an independent evaluator ensures that the produced ballot printers are consistent with the evaluated and certified TOE samples.
Delivery	Once the devices have been qualified, an Authority for distribution distributes the devices to the municipalities.
Long Term Storage	After their distribution to the municipalities or after an election, ballot printers require a secure long time storage at the Municipal authority to ensure that they cannot be manipulated.
Prepare for use	The preparation of the ballot printer comprises the configuration of election options (e.g. parties and candidates), assigning tokens to elections as well as a test of the devices whether all components work correct. The configuration shall be done by the (de)Configurator .
Storage after configuration	After configuration, the Municipal authority will store the systems in a secured area that the municipal authority has designated for this purpose.
Delivery to polling station	The Municipal authority will transport the systems to the polling station.
Startup	The startup of the ballot printer on the day of the election is done by the electoral committee .
Operation	In its operational phase, the ballot printer is used by the voters to print their choice. They must activate the ballot printer by the token that they received from the electoral committee. Once the voting has ended, the electoral committee shuts the ballot printer down. If during operation a ballot printer's self-protection mechanism registers a manipulation or defect then the ballot printer will go the "Frozen" state, both to prevent the ballot printer from being used for printing ballots and to protect the information contained therein.
Frozen	After the election, configuration data and logs shall remain in the ballot printer until the result of the election is confirmed by the

Life Cycle Phase	Description
	Central electoral committee or in case a criminal investigation has been initiated, after that investigation has been completed.
Delivery to storage	The Municipal authority will transport the systems from the polling station to a secured storage location(s) that it has designated for this purpose.
Storage after usage	After the voting, the Municipal authority will store the systems in a secured area that it has designated for this purpose. If the central electoral committee decides that a new vote is necessary, the municipal authority will transport the systems back to the polling station again.
Investigation (optional)	In case of malfunction, manipulation or suspicion of malfunction or manipulation, the ballot printer needs to be investigated. This investigation will be done by an authority for investigation .
Deconfiguration	After the central electoral committee has confirmed the outcome of the election the (de)Configurator deletes the election data and logs from the devices. The devices are then transferred to long-term storage.
End of life	In this phase, the Manufacturer destroys the ballot printer in a way, that it cannot be used again and that all data is deleted in a secure way.

283

Table 2. Life-cycle phases and their description

284 **1.4.8 TOE Modes**

285 The life cycle phases can be grouped into dedicated operational modes according to their required
 286 functionality. This allows the available functions of the modes to be reduced to the required minimums
 287 and reduces the likelihood of security violations. Furthermore, the limitation to a predefined sequence
 288 of modes helps to satisfy the security requirements that are implemented in the ballot printer. For the
 289 ballot printer the following operational modes have been defined:

- 290 • Election
 291 • Management

292

293 The relation between the life-cycle phases and the modes is shown in Table 3:


TOE mode	TOE life-cycle phase
Election	“Operation”,
Management	“Delivery”, “Long Term Storage”, “Prepare for user”, “Storage after configuration”, “Delivery to polling station”, “Startup”, “Frozen”, “Delivery to storage”, “Storage after usage”, “Investigation” and “Deconfiguration”

294

Table 3: Relation between TOE modes and life-cycle phases

295 The possible sequence of modes are depicted in Figure 8. In order to activate the “Election” mode it is
 296 necessary to present a token that is assigned to a role that is allowed to change the mode of the TOE.

297 Note: The TOE mode “Election” is not persistent, i.e. will change to “Management” in case of a
 298 shutdown of the system or power supply failures.



299
300 **Figure 8: TOE mode diagram of the ballot printer**

301 Every mode has the following two authentication sub states:

- 302
- 303 • NOT AUTHENTICATED: TOE has been powered on, no token present.
 - 304 • AUTHENTICATED: TOE has been powered on, role holder token authentication has been performed successfully.

305 The TOE is not aware of the following life-cycle phases:

- 306
- 307 • Specification
 - 308 • Development
 - 309 • Certification
 - 310 • Production
 - 310 • Qualification

311 **Application Note:**

312 The TOE starts to exist after production and qualification. During qualification all TOE modes are
313 available and tested. Table 3 shows the relation between the defined TOE life-cycle phases and TOE
314 operational modes.

315

316 **1.4.9 Authentication Token**


317 The token to activate the modes and to gain access to the ballot printer for the voter and administrative
318 tasks is not part of the TOE. For such authentication tokens standard Protection Profiles exist and CC
319 practise is to re-use these and extend them with the additional features and the evaluation level needed.
320 The activation tokens shall be based on devices that have been evaluated according [PP-AM].

321

322 **1.4.10 TOE data structure**

323 The data that is used by the TOE can be divided into two main parts:

- 324
- 324 • User data
 - 325 • TOE Security Functionality (TSF) data



326
327
Figure 9: TSF data structure

328 **User data:**

329 User data refers to the data that is processed by the voter and that has to be protected in terms of
330 confidentiality and integrity and authenticity. The only data that can be entered by the voter is their
331 choice and from the choice the ephemeral data may be derived. Hence, the user data in this context is
332 limited to the choice of the voter and the ephemeral data which must be deleted after the voter's choice
333 has been printed.

334 It should be noted that the system of authentication of the TOE is based on tokens. Those tokens are
335 treated as users even though the TOE will never get hold of the real user identity (which is an
336 important aspect in the context of the secrecy of the vote).

337 **TSF data:**

338 Refers to all other data that are necessary to operate the TOE and to provide the functionality to the
339 voter who needs to make a choice and to print that choice. All of the other data does not belong to a
340 dedicated user but is necessary to guarantee the functionality of the TOE, hence is summarised as TSF
341 data. The following list of TSF data summarizes the information that is used in the context of this PP.
342 Note however that this list does not claim to be complete.

- 343
- The log file
 - 344 • Information about the authentication token (i.e. the link between the token ID and the role,
345 public keys)
 - 346 • Configuration data for election
 - 347 • The time
- 348

349 **2 Conformance Claims**

350 **2.1 Conformance statement**

351 This PP requires **strict conformance** of any PP/ST to this PP.

352 **2.2 CC Conformance Claims**

353 This PP has been developed using Version 3.1 Revision 4 of Common Criteria [CC].

- 354 • This PP claims conformance to [CC] part 2 extended.
- 355 • This PP claims conformance to [CC] part 3 extended.

356 **2.3 PP Claim**

357 This PP does not claim conformance to any other PP.

358 **2.4 Conformance claim rationale**

359 Since this PP does not claim conformance to any Protection Profile, this section is not applicable.

360 **2.5 Package Claim**

361 This PP is conforming to assurance package EAL4 as defined in [CC] Part 3 augmented by the use of
362 ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5 and an explicitly drafted assurance component, ALC_DEL.2.

363 The SFRs in this PP form a functional package “ballot printer functionality” and use SFRs from part 2
364 of CC plus one extended component named FPT_EMSEC.1.

365 **3 Security Problem Definition**

366 The Security Problem Definition (SPD) is the part of a PP, which describes

- 367 • the **external entities** that are foreseen to interact with the TOE,
 368 • the **assets** which the TOE shall protect,
 369 • the **assumptions** on security relevant properties and behaviour of the TOE's environment,
 370 • **threats** against the assets, which shall be averted by the TOE together with its environment,
 371 • **operational security policies**, which describe overall security requirements defined by the
 372 organisation in charge of the overall system including the TOE.

373 **3.1 External entities**

374 The following external entities are allowed to interact with the ballot printer in dedicated modes.

375 Those roles have been defined for the use in this Protection Profile.

376

Role	Description
(de)Configurator	<p>The central electoral committee for an election decides on the admission of lists that can participate in an election and the admission of the candidates that can be put on the lists. The admitted lists and candidates and the admitted question(s) for a referendum are published.</p> <p>The (de)configurator shall check the ballot printer before being used during the ballot. The checks that the (de)configurator needs to perform includes (but are not limited to):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Checking the version of the software • Conducting a self-test, including a check of the security of the ballot printer • Checking the integrity of the hardware, software and data <p>After these checks have been successfully performed the (de)configurator uploads the list of parties and candidates or the question(s) for a referendum the ballot printer requires in the election mode. The role is also responsible for additional configuration data that is required by the TOE, like linking sets of tokens to elections. The (de)configurator then performs a functional test.</p> <p>The ballot printer maintains a log file with stored audit events (not the choices made by the voter).</p> <p>The (de)configurator is allowed to read and export the information from this log file and other data that is relevant for analysis.</p> <p>Furthermore it falls into the responsibility of the (de)configurator to delete the election data after the central electoral committee has announced the outcome of the election or - in case a criminal investigation has been initiated - after that investigation has been completed.</p>
Electoral committee	<p>A member of the electoral committee is responsible to start up the ballot printer on the day of election.</p> <p>The startup of the ballot printer requires a token.</p> <p>A member of the electoral committee is also responsible to perform a basic self-test with the ballot printer before they can be used and test</p>

Role	Description
	<p>its proper working by making one or more print(s) of a choice.</p> <p>The voting process as described in section 1.4.3.2 assumes that the voter will first report to the electoral committee.</p> <p>It falls into the responsibility of a member of the electoral committee to check whether the voter is authorized to vote. After successful checking, the voter will be handed out one or more tokens that the voter can use to activate the ballot printer to make one vote choice for each token.</p> <p>Such a token will be a smartcard.</p>
Voter	The voter can be seen as the primary user of the ballot printer. The voter will use the ballot printer to make his/her choice and to print that choice.

377

Table 4: Roles used in the Protection profile378 **3.2 Assets**

379 The following table lists the assets that will need to be protected by the TOE.

380

Asset	Description	Need for Protection
Choice	<p>The choice (which can also be a blank choice) of the voter is the primary asset of the ballot printer. The choice means on the one hand the selection of a party and a candidate or the selection of an answer to a referendum question on the ballot printer (see figure 1).</p> <p>It shall be ensured that</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The choice is kept confidential • The ballot printer prints the choice after a confirmation of the voter to a ballot paper • Only voters with an authentic token are able to use the ballot printer <p>Please note that the term “choice” should be seen as an abstract asset. It is possible that - depending on the election process - a voter chooses for more than one combination of a list and candidate (specifically in the case of proxy voting) or for more than one referendum. In this case, every choice will be printed on a separate ballot paper.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Confidentiality and integrity of the choice • Correctness of the printout of the choice
Token data	<p>The TOE is activated by tokens. This means that tokens are presented to the TOE to enable one of the modes described in Table 13 and the corresponding functionality of the role. The TOE shall verify the authenticity of the token, identify the token and the role that is associated with this token and whether this role is allowed in the current mode. In this context, token data explicitly refers to data that is stored in the ballot printer it does not refer to any data that is stored on the token.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity

Asset	Description	Need for Protection
	The roles the TOE shall be able to separate are depicted in Table 4.	
Logs	The ballot printer maintains log files. Log files must be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity. It is however required that log files in the devices are securely deleted as soon as the results of an election process have been declared or in case a criminal investigation has been initiated, after that investigation has been completed.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity • Confidentiality (Only specific roles have access to the log files)
Ephemeral ballot printer data	The ballot printer may need to work with ephemeral data in the course of its operation. Such ephemeral data includes but is not limited to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The activation data of the voter • The choice of the voter • Log file information before written to persistent storage This ephemeral data need to be protected in terms of confidentiality and integrity as long as used and the choice of the voter needs to be securely erased as soon as the choice has been printed. All ephemeral data needs to be deleted when the results of an election process have been declared or in case a criminal investigation has been initiated, after that investigation has been completed. After erasing choices of the voter it then may be possible that traces of vote choices are still in the ballot printer, but it must not be possible, using tools, to recover a vote choice.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity • Confidentiality (the choice of the voter needs to be deleted in a secure way at the end of the printing session)
Configuration data	The configuration data contains information about the upcoming election or elections (if more than one election takes place on one day) that is going to take place or is taking place that the ballot printer has to be used in. It also comprises the list of parties and list of candidates or the referendum question(s) for each current election. It shall be protected in terms of authenticity and integrity.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity
Hardware	The hardware of the ballot printer can be seen as a dedicated asset. The hardware shall be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity in order to allow a secure operation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity
Software	The software of the ballot printer can be seen as a dedicated asset. The software shall be protected in terms of integrity and authenticity in order to allow a secure operation.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integrity • Authenticity

Table 5: Assets

381

382

383

384 **3.3 Assumptions**

385 In general IT-systems, there is often a need to assume that at least a subset of the subjects that are
386 interacting with the system can be assumed to be non-hostile.

387 For a voting process however, such assumptions will have to be very limited. Specifically, almost
388 everybody who gets in contact with the ballot printer for making choices – either as a user or from an
389 organisational perspective – may have a motivation, the resources and also the opportunity to
390 manipulate (or at least attempt to manipulate) the devices. This motivation does not have to aim to
391 actually manipulate the ballot printer, but can also aim to only prove that manipulation is possible, so
392 that the confidence in the reliability of the ballot printer is reduced or dropped.

393 It has therefore been the clear scope in the course of the development of this chapter to put only the
394 absolute minimum level of trust into the administrative roles and the user of the ballot printer.

395

Assumption	Description
A.Replacement	It is assumed that a sufficient amount of ballot printers are available in case a malfunction occurs and a device becomes un-operational and has to be replaced.
A.SecurityFeature	It is assumed that the ballot paper has a security feature that protects against forged ballot paper. This security feature will be checked by the electoral committee when the number of counted ballot papers is larger than the number of admitted voters and should contribute to prevent that a ballot paper is counted without the feature.
A.Expendable	It is assumed that any expendable material that is used by the ballot printer is available at an adequate amount.
A.PollingStation	It is assumed that a voter is not restricted to one specific polling station to cast his vote. Within a municipality the voter can choose a polling station where he wants to cast his vote.
A.PrinterLocation	It is assumed that the ballot printer is situated in the polling station in a way that it is possible for the voter to make a choice and print the ballot paper without someone else in the polling station visually seeing what choice has been made.
A.Environment	It is assumed that the ballot printer is operated in a controlled environment. During storage, configuration and transportation it is assumed that the ballot printer is safe. It is further assumed that before the voting process starts the feature to verify the authenticity of the ballot printer will be used ³ . It is also assumed that during the voting process a voter does not have unlimited access to the ballot printer. It is possible that a voter or other persons are present in a polling station during the whole day of the election. However, the access to the ballot printer itself should be limited to the moment where the voter casts their choice. Of course, in this situation the voter will have direct and

³ The assumptions regarding storage, configuration, transportation and the verification of authenticity are not realistic and enforceable (from a security point of view). These assumptions in the current Protection Profile are necessary because there are no known other physical protection mechanisms to warrant the integrity of the hardware of the ballot printer. It is assumed that manipulation of the ballot printer resulting in printing wrong results would be detected by voters when visually checking their ballots. That is possible since the ballots will exclusively contain human interpretable content. This measure mitigates to some extent the risk of ballot printer manipulation during storage, configuration and transportation.

Assumption	Description
	unaccompanied access to the ballot printer. On the other hand, the voter will not be in a separate room and the whole process that requires interaction with the ballot printer happens in a room in which also members of the electoral committee are present.
A.Admin	It is assumed that the administrative roles ⁴ that interact with the ballot printer have been trained with respect to their responsibilities. However it is not assumed that those administrative roles are skilled in detection of attempts of attacks on the ballot printer or are able to detect that there is a malfunction. Furthermore it is assumed, that storage and distribution of the tokens falls into the responsibility of an administrative role and that therefore, for the ballot printer, it can be assumed that only persons that are allowed to have access to the tokens can have that access. Storage and distribution in this case refers on the one hand to the phase when an election is prepared and the tokens are distributed to the administrative roles that operate the TOE. On the other hand this refers to the ballot itself, when the electoral committee is responsible to hand the correct token to the voter after his/her authorised to make a choice with the ballot printer.
A.Token	It is assumed that the tokens are evaluated according to [PP_AM].
A.SM	It is assumed that the TOE has a built-in security module that provides the required cryptographic functionality and has been certified according to [PP_SM].

396

Table 6: Assumptions

397 3.4 Threats

398 The following section identifies the threats that are posed against the assets handled by the TOE. The
399 description contains on the one hand the primary target of the attack as well as the threat agent that
400 might conduct the attack. In this context, the term **general attacker** is used. The general attacker can
401 be characterized as an attacker with high attack potential in terms of Common Criteria. He must not
402 have the aim to actually manipulate the ballot printer, but can merely aim to proof that manipulation is
403 possible, so that the confidence in the reliability of the ballot printer is reduced or dropped This means
404 that the attacker

- 405 • May spend a relevant amount of time in order to prepare/conduct an attack
- 406 • Is highly skilled
- 407 • Has internal knowledge about the ballot printer and the vote counter
- 408 • Has access to the devices that is almost unlimited (even though the devices may not be in their
409 operational mode)
- 410 • Has access to sophisticated equipment.

411

Threat	Description
T.MultipleChoices	An attacker could try to achieve that the choice of a voter is printed multiple times or that different choices are printed multiple times. This attack is primarily directed against the ballot printer. The attacker can try to achieve the multiple printing either for their own choice or for choices of voters who are afterwards using the ballot printer. The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to

⁴ This basically refers to everybody interacting with the devices but the voter

Threat	Description
	<p>achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.LeakChoice	<p>An attacker could try to achieve that the choice of a voter is leaked during the process of making a choice with the ballot printer.</p> <p>In general it can be assumed that the voter themselves does not have any motivation to make their own choice leak from the ballot printer (the voter could achieve this way easier).</p> <p>The attack can be driven by a voter who is trying to manipulate the ballot printer in a way that all subsequent choices of other voters are leaked. Additionally a voter can try to manipulate the ballot printer in the case that they sold their vote or is pressured to prove their choice. Further, the attack may be driven by a general attacker who accesses the ballot printer outside its operational phase. For example the ballot printer could be manipulated in a way that it stores the vote, e.g. in the log file or on another storage implemented by the attacker. This then would make it possible for the attacker to leak the choice outside the election phase.</p>
T.WrongVote	<p>An attacker could try to achieve that the vote of a voter is counted for a wrong candidate. The attacker may utilize functionality of the ballot printer to printout a choice in a way that will cause the vote counter to count wrong. It is further possible that an attacker in this scenario manipulates the ballot paper that has been (correctly) produced by the ballot printer in a way that will cause the vote counter to count wrong before the manipulated ballot paper is inserted into the ballot box.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process for themselves or for subsequent voters. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by the vote counter operator who manipulates the ballot papers to achieve this goal or a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.WrongChoice	<p>An attacker could try to achieve that the choice of a voter is printed for a wrong candidate, blank or invalid.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process for themselves or for subsequent voters. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.WrongPoll	<p>An attacker could try to achieve that the configuration data that the ballot printer uses is wrong. This explicitly includes the case that the configuration data of the vote counter is not identical with the configuration data that was used by the ballot printer. This could lead to a situation in which a significant amount of votes are not counted as voters would vote for parties and candidates who are not allowed to participate in the election. Further, this could lead to a malfunction in counting the votes as the vote counter would try to recognize votes for parties and candidates that are actually not allowed to participate in the election.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be an administrative user who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can be prepared by a general attacker. Also a combination of these attackers is possible.</p>

Threat	Description
T.WithholdVote	<p>An attacker could try to achieve that a cast vote is withheld. With other words, a vote of a voter is not counted by the vote counter.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the printing process but for all subsequent voters. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.Log	<p>An attacker could try to gain access to the log files in order to manipulate, delete or to leak them.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p> <p>As part of this attack, the attacker could try to modify the internal clock</p>
T.UnauthorizedAdmin	<p>An attacker in this scenario could try to use administrative functions that he is not authorized for.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.UnauthorisedUse	<p>An attacker in this scenario could try to use the ballot printer without authorization.</p> <p>The attacker in this case will be a general attacker because the authorized voter is allowed to use the ballot printer.</p> <p>For case that a voter tries to print more than the allowed ballot papers, see T.MultipleChoices.</p>
T.WrongModeChange	<p>An attacker in this scenario could try to manipulate the mode changes the ballot printer is allowed to go through. The impact of this attack would be that the attacker has access to functionalities that should not be available at this point of time.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.ModifyUserInterface	<p>An attacker in this scenario could try to change the user interface to influence or limit the voters choices. For example present certain candidates more or less favorable and make it more difficult to make a specific vote choice or to make a vote choice at all.</p> <p>The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack for the consecutive voters after him in the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.</p>
T.Hack	<p>An attacker in this scenario interacts with the ballot printer, its interfaces or parts of it to find vulnerabilities and even tries to exploit vulnerabilities. This may compromise security and affects all assets. The goal of the attacker may be just to prove that there are vulnerabilities without compromising security or any assets and by doing so bring the whole voting system in discredit.</p>

Threat	Description
	The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.
T.System_Forgery	An attacker in this scenario replaces the ballot printer, or parts of it, with counterfeit parts or presents false parts as genuine ballot printer parts. This threatens ballot printer integrity, but may also result in compromise of assets. The goal of the attacker may be just to prove that a complete ballot printer or parts can be replaced by non authentic ones without being noticed and by doing so bring the whole voting system in discredit. The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.
T.DOS	An attacker in this scenario disrupts the voting process by performing a Denial of Service Attack on ballot printers, making ballot printers unavailable for making a vote choice. Denial of service attacks use a vulnerability to make ballot printers unavailable or try to overload the ballot printers or its interfaces in order to make them unavailable. Physical abuse in excess of what can be considered as regular use is excluded. The goal of the attacker may be just to prove that ballot printer are vulnerable to Denial of Service Attacks and by doing so bring the whole voting system in discredit. The attacker in this scenario can either be the voter who is trying to achieve the goal of the attack in the course of the voting process. On the other hand the attack can also be prepared or conducted by a general attacker. Also a combination of both attackers is possible.

412

Table 7: Threats

413

414 3.5 Organizational Security Policies (OSPs)

415 Organizations security policies (OSPs) are means to require functionality from a system that is
416 considered in this Protection Profile even though such functionality is not directly needed to mitigate
417 an attack against the system.

418 The following OSPs will have to be implemented by the devices in this system.

419

OSP	Description
OSP.Log	The ballot printer shall maintain a log of security relevant events. Those events shall include all actions which have been performed on the ballot printer except any information about the choice of the voter in the ballot printer.

420

Table 8: Organizations security policies

421

422 **4 Security Objectives**423 **4.1 Security Objectives for the TOE**

Objective	Description
O.Process	The TOE shall ensure that the voter is able to print their choice during an election in a confidential way. The TOE shall print the choice of the voter to the ballot paper in a way that the voter can see the printed choice before dropping it in the ballot box to make sure the choice reflects the intended vote.
O.Integrity	The TOE shall ensure that the processed data is kept integer as long as it remains in the TOE. This refers to the ephemeral data that is used to guide the user through their choice and is kept inside of the TOE until the choice of the voter is printed as well as to the data that is permanently stored in the TOE (such as the log file).
O.Log	The TOE shall generate audit events for each action that is performed by the TOE except those events that would lead to a leakage of the voter's choice. The integrity of the audit log file shall be ensured and only accessible for specific roles in dedicated modes.
O.Management	<p>The TOE shall provide functions to authorized roles within dedicated modes to manage the configuration of the TOE or to use/manage security features.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Authorized roles shall be able to upload the election data (parties and candidates or referendum question(s)) • Authorized roles shall be able to upload the token data that is responsible for the access control. • Authorized roles shall be able to delete the election data and log files after the central electoral committee has confirmed the outcome of the election or in case a criminal investigation has been initiated, after that investigation has been completed. • Authorized roles shall be able to read the audit logs.
O.DataExchange	<p>The TOE shall provide an interface that allows administrative roles export and import of signed data.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The TOE shall be able to verify imported election and token data in terms of authenticity and integrity and only accept this data after verification • The TOE shall be able to verify software/firmware updates in terms of authenticity and integrity and only accept this data after verification • The TOE shall be able to sign the log file to ensure its authenticity and integrity after the export.
O.Selfprotection	<p>The TOE shall implement functions to protect itself against manipulation, forgery, malfunction and overload. The ballot printer shall have features to detect physical tampering and verify its authenticity.</p> <p>This functionality shall specifically protect against modification of hardware, software, the use of test modes or of existing back doors even if this does not affect security or assets. Furthermore, the manipulation of the power supply shall not lead to a successful attack.</p>
O.AccessControl	The TOE shall control access to the TOE and to its functionality based on roles and dedicated modes as described in chapter 1.4.8. This means that

Objective	Description
	<p>the TOE has predefined mode changes and within each mode only dedicated roles are allowed to interact with the TOE.</p> <p>The TOE shall authenticate a digital token that are associated with a dedicated role (This does not mean that the TOE gains any information about the user of the TOE) and check whether this token can activate the TOE in its current mode.</p> <p>The TOE shall ensure that it can only be activated if the role that is represented by the token is authorized for this mode. As part of the login process of roles the TOE shall – before login – present a banner message on the authorized use of the TOE and – after successful login of an administrative role – information about the last logins of that role.</p>

424 4.2 Security objectives for the operational environment

Objective for environment	Description
OE.Replacement	It shall be ensured that a sufficient amount of ballot printers are available in case a malfunction occurs and a device becomes un-operational and has to be replaced.
OE.SecurityFeature	A ballot paper that is printed by a ballot printer contains a security feature that protects against forged ballot paper. This security feature will be checked by the electoral committee when the number of counted ballot papers is larger than the number of admitted voters and should contribute to prevent that a ballot paper is counted without the feature.
OE.Expendable	It shall be ensured that any expendable material that is used by the ballot printer is available at an adequate amount.
OE.PollingStation	It shall be ensured that a voter can choose from several polling stations in the municipality to cast his vote.
OE.PrinterLocation	It shall be ensured that the ballot printer is installed in such a way that it is possible for the voter to make a choice and print the ballot paper without someone else in the polling station seeing what choice has been made.
OE.Environment	It shall be ensured that the ballot printer is operated in a controlled environment during the election. During storage, configuration and transportation the ballot printer should be safe. Before the voting process starts the feature to verify the authenticity of the ballot printer will be used ⁵ . This also means that it shall be ensured that a voter does not have unlimited access to the ballot printer. It is possible that a voter or other persons are present in a polling station during the whole day of the election. However, the access to the ballot printer itself should be limited to the moment where the voter makes their choice. Of course, in this situation the voter will have direct and unaccompanied access to the ballot printer. On the other hand, the voter will not be in a separate room and the whole process that requires interaction with the ballot printer happens in a room in which also members of the electoral committee are present.

⁵ The objectives regarding storage, configuration, transportation and the verification of authenticity are not realistic and enforceable (from a security point of view). These objectives in the current Protection Profile are necessary because there are no known other physical protection mechanisms to warrant the integrity of the hardware of the ballot printer.

Objective for environment	Description
OE.Admin	<p>It shall be ensured that the administrative roles that interact with the ballot printer have been trained with respect to their responsibilities. However those administrative roles shall not be skilled in detection of attempts of attacks on the ballot printer or are able to detect that there is malfunction.</p> <p>Furthermore it is assumed that storage and distribution of the tokens falls into the responsibility of an administrative role and can therefore regarded to be secure. Storage and distribution in this case refers on the one hand to the phase when an election is prepared and the tokens are distributed to the administrative roles that operate the TOE.</p> <p>On the other hand this refers to ballot itself, when the electoral committee is responsible to hand the correct token(s) to the voter after his/her authorisation to make one ore more vote choices with the ballot printer.</p>
OE.Token	It shall be ensured that the token for the voter and administrative purposes are evaluated according to [PP_AM].
OE.SM	It shall be ensured that the TOE has a built-in security module that provides the required cryptographic functionality and that has been certified according to [PP_SM].

425 **4.3 Security Objectives rationale**

426 **4.3.1 Overview**

427 The following table gives an overview how the assumptions, threats, and organisational security
428 policies are addressed by the security objectives. The text of the following sections justifies this more
429 in detail.

	O.Process	O.Integrity	O.Log	O.Management	O.DataExchange	O.Selfprotection	O.AccessControl	OE.Replacement	OE.SecurityFeature	OE.Expendable	O.E.PollingStation	OE.PrinterLocation	OE.Environment	OE.Admin	OE.Token	OE.SM
T.MultipleChoices						X	X						X	X		
T.LeakChoice	X					X						X				
T.WrongVote		X				X										
T.WrongChoice	X	X				X										
T.WrongPoll				X	X	X										
T.WithholdVote						X		X		X	X					
T.Log			X		X	X	X									
T.UnauthorizedAdmin						X	X							X	X	
T.UnauthorisedUse						X	X							X		
T.WrongModeChange						X	X									
T.ModifyUserInterface						X										
T.Hack						X										
T.System_Forgery						X							X			
T.DOS						X							X			
OSP.Log			X			X										
A.Replacement								X								
A.SecurityFeature									X							
A.Expendable										X						
A.PollingStation											X					
A.PrinterLocation												X				
A.Environment													X			
A.Admin														X		
A.Token															X	
A.SM																X

430

Table 9: Rationale for Security Objectives

431 **4.3.2 Countering the threats**

432 The following sections provide more detailed information on how the threats are countered by the

433 security objectives for the TOE and its operational environment.

434 **4.3.2.1 General objectives**

435 The security objectives **O.Selfprotection** contribute to counter each threat.

436 **O.Management** is needed as it defines the requirements around the management of the Security
437 Functions. Without a secure management no TOE can be secure. Also **OE.Admin** contributes to this
438 aspect as it provides the requirements on the availability of trustworthy roles. **O.Process** as well as
439 **OE.PrinterLocation** ensures that the requirements for a confidential printing are fulfilled.
440 **O.Integrity** requires the TOE to protect data in terms of integrity. Relevant events except the choice of
441 the voter will be audited according **O.Log** that enables control whether the TOE works as specified.
442 **O.DataExchange** allows import and export of required data, while its integrity and authenticity is
443 ensured by the TOE's digital signature. **O.AccessControl** ensures that only authorized roles are able to
444 get access to the ballot printer depending on its current mode and print ballot papers.

445 Those general objectives that have been argued in the previous paragraphs will not be addressed in
446 detail in the following paragraphs.

447

448 **4.3.2.2 T.MultipleChoices**

449 The threat **T.MultipleChoices** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.SelfProtection**,
450 **O.AccessControl**, **OE.Environment** and **OE.Admin**.

451 **O.Selfprotection** and **OE.Environment** ensure that the TOE cannot be manipulated without detection
452 to print more than the allowed number of ballot papers. **O.AccessControl** restricts the functionality of
453 the TOE to authorized roles in a way that only voters with a token are able to print a vote choice on a
454 ballot paper . **OE.Admin** should ensure that voters that are authorized to vote get one or more tokens
455 that each enable the ballot printer to make and print one vote choice.

456 **4.3.2.3 T.LeakChoice**

457 The threat **T.LeakChoice** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Process**,
458 **O.Selfprotection** and **OE.PrinterLocation**.

459 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the TOE cannot be manipulated without detection to leak the choice of
460 the voter. **O.Process** requires the TOE to provide a functionality that enables the voter to cast their
461 choice in a confidential way. **OE.PrinterLocation** requires that is not physically possible that other
462 subjects can see the choice of the voter.

463 **4.3.2.4 T.WrongVote**

464 The threat **T.WrongVote** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Integrity** and
465 **O.Selfprotection**.

466 **O.Integrity** ensures the integrity of data that is processed within the ballot printer. Therefore, the
467 ballot printer cannot be used to generate printouts that would lead to unintended votes.
468 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that it is not possible to manipulate without detection the functionality to
469 generate printouts that would lead to unintended votes.

470 **4.3.2.5 T.WrongChoice**

471 The threat **T.WrongChoice** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Process**,
472 **O.Integrity** and **O.Selfprotection**.

473 **O.Process** makes it possible for the voter to check the printed ballot paper for its correctness and
474 detect if the choice on the ballot paper is not the intended choice. **O.Integrity** requires the
475 functionality of the TOE to protect the integrity of the choice as long as it is processed in the TOE and
476 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without detection to manipulate
477 a choice.

478

479 4.3.2.6 T.WrongPoll

480 The threat **T.WrongPoll** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Management**,
481 **O.DataExchange** and **O.Selfprotection**.

482 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the election data cannot be manipulated by unauthorised users without
483 detection. **O.Management** restricts the access to the management functionality of the TOE and the
484 token that activates the functionality to configure the election data to authorized persons.
485 **O.DataExchange** ensures that only data with verifiable integrity and authenticity can be imported into
486 the TOE.

487 4.3.2.7 T.WithholdVote

488 The threat **T.WithholdVote** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Selfprotection**,
489 **OE.Replacement**, **OE.Expendable** and **OE.PollingStation**.

490 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without detection in a way that
491 the printed ballot paper is not countable by the vote counter. **OE.Replacement** and **OE.Expendable**
492 ensure that spare ballot printers as well as used materials are available at an adequate amount for the
493 case that the ballot printer becomes un-operational or that the material like ink or papers in the ballot
494 printer are empty. **OE.PollingStation** ensures that the voter can cast his vote in another polling station
495 in case ballot printer(s) in a polling station cannot be used.

496 4.3.2.8 T.Log

497 The threat **T.Log** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Log**, **O.DataExchange**,
498 **O.Selfprotection** and **O.AccessControl**.

499 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the log in the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without detection.
500 **O.Log** and **O.AccessControl** ensure that only authorized roles have access to the log and that every
501 action except the choice of the user is recorded with integrity. **O.DataExchange** requires that exported
502 audit records must be signed to ensure its integrity.

503 4.3.2.9 T.UnauthorizedAdmin

504 The threat **T.UnauthorizedAdmin** is covered by a combination of the security objectives
505 **O.Selfprotection** **O.AccessControl**, **OE.Admin** and **OE.Token**.

506 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without detection to use
507 administrative functionalities outside the specification. **O.AccessControl** and **OE.Admin** ensure that
508 users can only gain access to the functionalities that they are allowed to use. **OE.Token** requires the
509 use of tokens that have been evaluated in accordance with [PP-AM] and must therefore ensure a high
510 security against manipulation.

511 4.3.2.10 T.UnauthorisedUse

512 The threat **T.UnauthorizedUsed** is covered by a combination of the security objectives
513 **O.Selfprotection** **O.AccessControl** and **OE.Admin**.

514 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without detection to enable the
515 printing by persons without a token. **O.AccessControl** and **OE.Admin** ensure that a user only gains
516 access with the token to the functionalities they are allowed to use in a specific mode of the TOE.

517 4.3.2.11 T.WrongModeChange

518 The threat **T.WrongModeChange** is covered by a combination of the security objectives
519 **O.Selfprotection** and **O.AccessControl**.

520 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without a detection to make a
521 mode change that is not allowed and gain access to functionalities that should not be available.
522 **O.AccessControl** enforces that only persons that are represented by dedicated token can change the
523 mode of the TOE to "Election" and have no access to modes that should not be available.

524 4.3.2.12 T.ModifyUserInterface

525 The threat **T.ModifyUserInterface** is covered by the security objectives **O.Selfprotection**.

526 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer is protected against changing the functionality of the
527 ballot printer without a detection.

528 4.3.2.13 T.Hack

529 The threat **T.Hack** is covered by the security objective **O.Selfprotection**.

530 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer is protected against vulnerabilities to compromise or
531 exploit a ballot printer.

532 4.3.2.14 T.System_Forgery

533 The threat **T.System_forgery** is covered by the security objectives **O.Selfprotection** and
534 **OE.Environment**.

535 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that parts of the ballot printer cannot be manipulated without a detection.
536 The feature to verify authenticity makes it possible to detect a non authentic ballot printer.
537 **OE.Environment** ensures that the feature to verify the authenticity of the ballot printer is used before
538 the voting process starts.

539 4.3.2.15 T.DOS

540 The threat **T.DOS** is covered by a combination of the security objectives **O.Selfprotection** and
541 **OE.Environment**.

542 **O.Selfprotection** ensures that the ballot printer is protected against vulnerabilities that follow from
543 overloading the ballot printer or its interfaces. **OE.Environment** ensures that there is no unlimited
544 access to a ballot printer to overload the ballot printer or its interfaces to make it unavailable.

545 4.3.3 Coverage of organisational security policies

546 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives for the
547 environment and the TOE cover the organizational security policies.

548 4.3.3.1 OSP.Log

549 The Organisational Security Policy **OSP.Log** that mandates that the TOE maintains an audit log is
550 directly addressed by the security objective for the TOE **O.Log**

551

552 4.3.4 Coverage of assumptions

553 The following sections provide more detailed information about how the security objectives for the
554 environment cover the assumptions.

555 4.3.4.1 A.Replacement

556 The assumption **A.Replacement** is directly and completely covered by the security objective
557 **OE.Replacement**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the
558 correspondence is obvious.

559 4.3.4.2 A.SecurityFeature

560 The assumption **A.SecurityFeature** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE**.
561 **SecurityFeature**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the
562 correspondence is obvious.

563 4.3.4.3 A.Expendable

564 The assumption **A.Expandable** is directly and completely covered by the security objective
565 **OE.Expandable**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the
566 correspondence is obvious.

567 4.3.4.4 A.PollingStation

568 The assumption **A.PollingStation** is directly and completely covered by the security objective
569 **OE.PollingStation**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that

570 the correspondence is obvious.

571 **4.3.4.5 A.PrinterLocation**

572 The assumption **A.PrinterLocation** is directly and completely covered by the security objective
573 **OE.PrinterLocation**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that
574 the correspondence is obvious.

575 **4.3.4.6 A.Environment**

576 The assumption **A.Environment** is directly and completely covered by the security objective
577 **OE.Environment**. The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the
578 correspondence is obvious.

579 **4.3.4.7 A.Admin**

580 The assumption **A.Admin** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.Admin**.
581 The assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is
582 obvious.

583 **4.3.4.8 A.Token**

584 The assumption **A.Token** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.Token**. The
585 assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is
586 obvious.

587 **4.3.4.9 A.SM**

588 The assumption **A.SM** is directly and completely covered by the security objective **OE.SM**. The
589 assumption and the objective for the environment are drafted in a way that the correspondence is
590 obvious.

591

592 **5 Extended Component definition**

593 This Protection Profile uses components defined as extension to CC part 2 an part 3.

594 **5.1 Definition of the Family FPT_EMSEC**

595 The family FPT_EMSEC (TOE Emanation) of the Class FPT (Protection of the TSF) is used here to
 596 describe the IT security functional requirements of the TOE. The TOE shall prevent attacks against the
 597 TOE and other secret data where the attack is based on external observable physical phenomena of the
 598 TOE. Examples of such attacks are evaluation of TOE's electromagnetic radiation, simple power
 599 analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA), timing attacks, etc. This family describes the
 600 functional requirements for the limitation of intelligible emanations which are not directly addressed
 601 by any other component of CC part 2. The family FPT_EMSEC was taken from [PP-MRTD EAC].

602

603 The family "TOE Emanation (FPT_EMSEC)" is specified as follows.

604

605 **Family behaviour**


606

607 This family defines requirements to mitigate intelligible emanations.

608

609 **Component levelling:**

610



611

612

613 FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE emanation has two constituents:

614 FPT_EMSEC.1.1 Limit of Emissions requires to not emit intelligible emissions enabling access
 615 to TSF data or user data.

616

617 FPT_EMSEC.1.2 Interface Emanation requires not emit interface emanation enabling access to
 618 TSF data or user data

Management: FPT_EMSEC.1
 There are no management activities foreseen.

Audit: FPT_EMSEC.1
 There are no actions defined to be auditable.

619 **FPT_EMSEC.1 TOE Emanation**

FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [assignment: types of emissions] in excess of [assignment: specified limits] enabling access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [assignment: type of users] are unable to use the following interface [assignment: type of connection] to gain access to [assignment: list of types of TSF data] and [assignment: list of types of user data].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

620 **5.2 Definition of the Family ALC_DEL.2**621 **Objectives**

622 The concern of this family is the secure transfer of the finished TOE from the development
623 environment into the responsibility of the user.

624 The requirements for delivery call for system control and distribution facilities and procedures that
625 detail the measures necessary to provide assurance that the security of the TOE is maintained during
626 distribution of the TOE to the user. For a valid distribution of the TOE, the procedures used for the
627 distribution of the TOE address the objectives identified in the PP/ST relating to the security of the
628 TOE during delivery.

629 **The extension of this family shall ensure the qualification of every single ballot printer. This
630 means that every device shall be investigated after its production whether it corresponds to the
631 evaluated version of the TOE. The investigation shall ensure, that the developer has not changed
632 or modified any component.**

633 **Component levelling**

634
635 This family contains two components. An increasing level of protection is established by requiring
636 commensurability of the delivery procedures with the assumed attack potential in the family
637 Vulnerability analysis (AVA_VAN).

638 **Application notes**

639 Transportations from subcontractors to the developer or between different development sites are not
640 considered here, but in the family Development security (ALC_DVS).

641 The end of the delivery phase is marked by the transfer of the TOE into the responsibility of the user.
642 This does not necessarily coincide with the arrival of the TOE at the user's location.

643 The delivery procedures should consider, if applicable, issues such as:

- 644 a) ensuring that the TOE received by the consumer corresponds precisely to the evaluated
645 version of the TOE;
- 646 b) avoiding or detecting any tampering with the actual version of the TOE;
- 647 c) preventing submission of a false version of the TOE;
- 648 d) avoiding unwanted knowledge of distribution of the TOE to the consumer: there might be
649 cases where potential attackers should not know when and how it is delivered;

650 e) avoiding or detecting the TOE being intercepted during delivery; and

651 f) avoiding the TOE being delayed or stopped during distribution.

652 The delivery procedures should include the recipient's actions implied by these issues. The consistent
653 description of these implied actions is examined in the Preparative procedures (AGD_PRE) family, if
654 present.

655 The description of **ALC_DEL.2** refers to the terms “user” and “consumer”. Within this document,
656 these terms are synonym to the governmental agency that receives the produced ballot printers. It has
657 been balanced whether it was better to develop a new assurance component or to use a known compo-
658 nent and augment it. The latter has been chosen due to the assumption, that it is more suitable for
659 evaluation if dedicated components base on the existing structure of classes and families.

660 **ALC_DEL.2 Delivery procedures**

Dependencies: No dependencies.

Developer action elements:

ALC_DEL.2.1D The developer shall document and provide procedures for delivery of the TOE or parts of it to the consumer.

ALC_DEL.2.2D The developer shall use the delivery procedures.

ALC_DEL.2.3D The developer shall document and provide evidence that every single ballot printer corresponds precisely to the evaluated version of the TOE.

Content and presentation elements:

ALC_DEL.2.1C The delivery documentation shall describe all procedures that are necessary to maintain security when distributing versions of the TOE to the consumer.

Evaluator action elements:

ALC_DEL.1.1E The evaluator shall confirm that the information provided meets all requirements for content and presentation of evidence.

ALC_DEL.1.2E The evaluator shall confirm for every single ballot printer that it corresponds precisely to the evaluated version of the TOE.

661

662 6 Security Requirements

663 6.1 Overview

664 This chapter describes the security functional and the assurance requirements which have to be
 665 fulfilled by the TOE. Those requirements comprise functional components from part 2 of [CC] and the
 666 assurance components as defined for the Evaluation Assurance Level 4 from part 3 of [CC].

667 The following notations are used:

- 668 • **Refinement** operation (denoted by **bold text**): is used to add details to a requirement, and thus
 669 further restricts a requirement. In case that a word has been deleted from the original text this
 670 refinement is indicated by ~~crossed-out bold text~~.
- 671 • **Selection** operation (denoted by underlined text): is used to select one or more options
 672 provided by the [CC] in stating a requirement.
- 673 • **Assignment** operation (denoted by *italicised text*): is used to assign a specific value to an
 674 unspecified parameter, such as the length of a password.
- 675 • **Iteration** operation: are identified with a suffix in the name of the SFR (e.g.
 676 FMT_MOF.1/Mode).

677 It should be noted that the requirements in the following chapters are not necessarily be ordered
 678 alphabetically. Where useful the requirements have been grouped.

679 The following table summarises all TOE security functional requirements of this PP:

Class FAU: Security Audit	
FAU_ARP.1	Security alarms
FAU_GEN.1	Audit data generation
FAU_GEN.2	User identity association
FAU_SAA.1	Potential violation analysis
FAU_STG.1	Protected audit trail storage
FAU_STG.4	Prevention of audit data loss
Class FCS: Cryptographic Operation	
FCS_COP.1	Cryptographic Operation
Class FDP: User Data Protection	
FDP_ACC.2	Complete access control
FDP_ACF.1	Security attribute based access control
FDP_DAU.1	Basic Data Authentication
FDP_IFC.2	Complete information flow control
FDP_IFF.1	Simple security attributes
FDP_ITT.2	Transmission separation by attribute
FDP_ITT.4	Attribute-based integrity monitoring

FDP_RIP.2	Full residual information protection
FDP_SDI.2	Stored data integrity monitoring and action
Class FIA: Identification and Authentication	
FIA_AFL.1	Authentication failure handling
FIA_ATD.1	User attribute definition
FIA_UAU.2	User authentication before any action
FIA_UID.2	User identification before any action
FIA_USB.1	User-subject binding
Class FMT: Security Management	
FMT_MTD.1	Management of TSF data
FMT_MOF.1	Management of security functions behaviour
FMT_MOF.1/Mode	Management of security functions behaviour for the mode
FMT_MSA.3	Static attribute initialisation
FMT_MSA.1	Management of security attributes
FMT_MSA.2	Secure security attributes
FMT_SMR.1	Security roles
FMT_SMF.1	Specification of Management Functions
Class FPR: Privacy	
FPR_ANO.2	Anonymity without soliciting information
FPR_UNL.1	Unlinkability
FPR_UNO.1	Unobservability
FPR_UNO.3	Unobservability without soliciting information
Class FPT: Protection of the TSF	
FPT_EMSEC	TOE emanation
FPT_PHP.2	Notification of physical attack
FPT_PHP.3	Resistance to physical attack
FPT_RCV.4	Function recovery
FPT_TST.1	TSF testing

FPT_FLS.1	Failure with preservation of secure state
FPT_STM.1	Reliable time stamps
Class FRU: Resource utilisation	
FRU_FLT.2	Limited fault tolerance
Class FTA: TOE access	
FTA_SSL.3	TSF-initiated termination
FTA_SSL.4	User-initiated termination
FTA_TAB.1	Default TOE access banners
FTA_TAH.1	TOE access history
FTA_TSE.1	TOE session establishment

680

Table 10: List of Security Functional Requirements

681 **6.2 Class FAU: Security Audit**682 **6.2.1.1 Security audit automatic response (FAU_ARP)**683 **6.2.1.1.1 FAU_ARP.1: Security alarms**

FAU_ARP.1.1 The TSF shall take [*notify the user and enter the mode “management”*] upon detection of a potential security violation.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FAU_SAA.1

684 **6.2.1.2 Security audit data generation (FAU_GEN)**685 **6.2.1.2.1 FAU_GEN.1: Audit data generation for system log**

FAU_GEN.1.1 The TSF shall be able to generate an audit record of the following auditable events:

- a) Start-up and shutdown of the audit functions;
- b) All auditable events for the [*detailed*] level of audit; and
- c) [*additional audit events for actions performed by the TOE as specified in Table 12,*
- d) [*assignment: further actions or none*]

FAU_GEN.1.2 The TSF shall record within each audit record at least the following information:

- a) Date and time of the event, type of event, subject identity (if applicable), and the outcome (success or failure) of the event; and
- b) For each audit event type, based on the auditable event definitions of the functional components included in the PP/ST, [*assignment: other audit relevant information*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FPT_STM.1

Application Note: The following table lists relevant events for the level of audit “detailed” structured after all used SFRs.

686

SFR	Audited events
FAU_ARP.1	Actions taken due to potential security violations.
FAU_GEN.1	-
FAU_GEN.2	-
FAU_SAA.1	Enabling and disabling of any of the analysis mechanisms; Automated responses performed by the tool.
FAU_STG.1	Actions taken due to exceeding of a threshold.
FAU_STG.4	Actions taken due to the audit storage failure.
FCS_COP.1	Any applicable cryptographic mode(s) of operation, subject attributes and object attributes.
FDP_ACC.2	-
FDP_ACF.1	The specific security attributes used in making an access check.
FDP_DAU.1	The identity of the subject that requested the evidence.
FDP_IFC.2	-
FDP_IFF.1	-
FDP_ITT.2	All attempts to transfer user data, including the protection method used and any errors that occurred.
FDP_ITT.4	The action taken upon detection of an integrity error.
FDP_RIP.2	-
FDP_SDI.2	The type of integrity error that occurred. The action taken upon detection of an integrity error.
FIA_AFL.1	The reaching of the threshold for the unsuccessful authentication attempts and the actions (e.g. disabling of a terminal) taken and the subsequent, if appropriate, restoration to the normal state (e.g. re-enabling of a terminal).
FIA_UAU.2	All use of the authentication mechanism.
FIA_USB.1	Success and failure of binding of user security attributes to a subject (e.g. success or failure to create a subject).
FIA_ATD.1	-

SFR	Audited events
FIA_UID.2	All use of the user identification mechanism, including the user identity provided.
FMT_MTD.1	All modifications to the values of TSF data.
FMT_MOF.1	All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the TSF.
FMT_MOF.1/Mode	All modifications in the behaviour of the functions in the TSF.
FMT_MSA.3	Modifications of the default setting of permissive or restrictive rules. All modifications of the initial values of security attributes.
FMT_MSA.1	All modifications of the values of security attributes.
FMT_MSA.2	All offered and rejected values for a security attribute; All offered and accepted secure values for a security attribute.
FMT_SMR.1	Every use of the rights of a role.
FMT_SMF.1	Use of the management functions.
FPR_ANO.2	The invocation of the anonymity mechanism.
FPR_UNL.1	The invocation of the unlinkability mechanism.
FPR_UNO.1	The observation of the use of a resource or service by a user or subject.
FPR_UNO.3	-
FPT_EMSEC	-
FPT_PHP.2	Detection of intrusion.
FPT_PHP.3	-
FPT_TST.1	Execution of the TSF self tests and the results of the tests.
FPT_RCV.4	If possible, the detection of a failure of a function.
FPT_FLS.1	Failure of the TSF.
FPT_STM.1	Providing a timestamp.
FRU_FLT.2	Any failure detected by the TSF.
FTA_SSL.3	Termination of an interactive session by the session locking mechanism.
FTA_SSL.4	Termination of an interactive session by the user.
FTA_TAB.1	-
FTA_TAH.1	-

SFR	Audited events
FTA_TSE.1	Capture of the value of the selected access parameters (e.g. location of access, time of access).

Table 11: Audited events based on the used SFRs

Event	Additional information
Update software/firmware code	Token ID
Import of election configuration data	Token ID
Test ballot printer function	Token ID
Export of the log file	Token ID
Erase of configuration data and log	Token ID
Import of token data	Token ID
Import of key store configuration data	Token ID
Perform selftest	Token ID
Print test choice	Token ID
Assign tokens to elections	Token ID
Export election configuration data	Token ID
Export token data	Token ID
Export firmware/software	Token ID
Activation with token	Token ID
Change of mode	Token ID
Collect used tokens from ballot printer	Token ID
Error that has occurred, like out of paper, paper jam, wrong token for current mode, not-authentic token used	Token ID
Inspect details on error messages	Token ID

Table 12: Additional Audit events

FAU_GEN.2.1 For audit events resulting from actions of identified users, the TSF shall be able to associate each auditable event with the identity of the user that caused the event.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1
FIA_UID.1

Application Note: It should be noted that the system of authentication of the TOE bases on tokens. Those tokens are treated as users even though the TOE will never get hold of the real user identity (which is an important aspect in the context of the secrecy of the vote). Whenever the identity of the user is mentioned in the context of an SFR, this therefore refers to the ID of the

token.

691

692 **6.2.1.3 Security audit analysis (FAU_SAA)**

693 **6.2.1.3.1 FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis**

FAU_SAA.1.1 The TSF shall be able to apply a set of rules in monitoring the audited events and based upon these rules indicate a potential violation of the enforcement of the SFRs.

FAU_SAA.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules for monitoring audited events:

- a. Accumulation or combination of [assignment: *subset of defined auditable events*] known to indicate a potential security violation;
- b. [assignment: *any other rules*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1

Application Note: The accumulation of events that has to be filled into the assignment in FAU_SAA.1.2 strongly depends on the concrete implementation of the TOE. It is therefore left open to the specification and ST author.

694

695

696 **6.2.1.4 Security audit event storage (FAU_STG)**

697 **6.2.1.4.1 FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage**

FAU_STG.1.1 The TSF shall protect the stored audit records in the audit trail from unauthorised deletion.

FAU_STG.1.2 The TSF shall be able to [prevent] unauthorised modifications to the stored audit records in the audit trail.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FAU_GEN.1

698 **6.2.1.4.2 FAU_STG.4: Prevention of audit data loss**

FAU_STG.4.1 The TSF shall [ignore audited events] and [*switch into the mode "management"*] if the audit trail is full.

Hierarchical to: FAU_STG.3

Dependencies: FAU_STG.1

Application Note: Before the audit trail is full the TOE must give warnings.

699 **6.3 Class FCS: Cryptographic Operation**

700 **6.3.1.1.1 FCS_COP.1 Cryptographic operation**

FDP_COP.1.1 The TSF shall perform [*hashing, signature verification*] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*assignment: cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic key sizes [*assignment: cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [*assignment: list of standards*].

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

Application Note: The signature algorithm, cryptographic algorithm and cryptographic key sizes will have to be agreed with the responsible public authority.

701

702 **6.4 Class FDP: User data protection**

703 **6.4.1.1 Access control policy (FDP_ACC)**

704 **6.4.1.1.1 FDP_ACC.2: Complete access control**

FDP_ACC.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*ballot printer access SFP*] on [

Subjects:

- *all users*
- [*assignment: list of further subjects, or none*].

Objects:

- *choice,*
- *ephemeral ballot printer data,*
- *all TSF data,*
- [*assignment: list of further objects, or none*].

] and all operations among subjects and objects covered by the SFP.

FDP_ACC.2.2 The TSF shall ensure that all operations between any subject controlled by the TSF and any object controlled by the TSF are covered by an access control SFP.

Hierarchical to: FDP_ACC.1

Dependencies: FDP_ACF.1

Application Note: The SFR FDP_ACC.2 introduces the access control policy for the TOE. A more functional overview over this can be found in chapter 1.4.8.

The TOE refers to the current mode of operation and the role of the current user for access control. In so far the access control functionality can be seen as a special form of a Role Based Access Control.

More details on the rules that are used for access control can be found in FDP_ACF.1.

705 **6.4.1.2 Access control functions (FDP_ACF)**706 **6.4.1.2.1 FDP_ACF.1: Security attribute based access control**

FDP_ACF.1.1	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [<i>ballot printer access SFP</i>] to objects based on the following: [<i>Security attributes for subjects:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Authenticated role of current user (ROLE_ID),</i> • <i>Current mode (MODE_ID)</i> • <i>[assignment: additional security attributes for subjects, or none]</i> <p><i>Security attributes for objects:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>[assignment: additional security attributes for objects, or none]</i> <p>].</p>
FDP_ACF.1.2	<p>The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed: [<i>An operation between a subject and an object shall be allowed if</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>A) the ROLE_ID has the permission to perform this operation (as depicted in Table 13) AND</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>B) The operation is permitted within the current mode (MODE_ID) (as depicted in Table 13)</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>Else</i></p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;"><i>The operation is prohibited</i></p> <p>].</p>
FDP_ACF.1.3	<p>The TSF shall explicitly authorise access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [<i>none</i>].</p>
FDP_ACF.1.4	<p>The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [<i>none</i>].</p>
Hierarchical to:	No other components
Dependencies:	FDP_ACC.1 FMT_MSA.3
Application Note:	<p>FDP_ACF.1 defines the access control policy for the TOE. As outlined in chapter 1.4.8 it bases on the role of the current user and the current mode of the TOE.</p> <p>The access control policy rules as defined in FDP_ACF.1.2 ensure that an operation is only allowed if the role has the permission and the functionality is available in the current mode.</p> <p>By using “none” in the assignments in FDP_ACF.1.3 and FDP_ACF.1.4 it is ensured that the ST author cannot define additional rules that would overrule this access control policy.</p>

707

TOE mode	Role (ROLE_ID)	Allowed Operations	Possible next mode(s) ⁶
MANAGEMENT		Change mode, only possible if configuration data is complete, tokens have been assigned to elections and number of polling station or ballot box has been entered	ELECTION
	Electoral Committee	Shutting down system	-
	Voter	None	-
	(de)Configurator	Import election configuration data Test ballot printer function	-
		Update software/firmware code	-
		Import Token data Import key store configuration data	-
		Assign tokens to elections	-
		Enter number of polling station or ballot box number	-
		Export log Export election configuration data Export token data Export firmware/software	-
		Erase configuration data and log	-
Shutting down system	-		
ELECTION	Electoral committee	Perform selftest Print test choice	-

⁶ A mode is identified by its MODE_ID

		Inspect details on error messages	-
		Collect used tokens from ballot printer	
		Shutting down system	MANAGEMENT
	Voter	Print choice	-
	(de)Configurator	None	-
	-	Detection of a possible manipulation or a defect	MANAGEMENT

708 Table 13: TOE modes and subjects allowed interaction in the mode

709

710 **6.4.1.3 Data authentication (FDP_DAU)**711 **6.4.1.3.1 FDP_DAU.1: Basic Data Authentication**

FDP_DAU.1.1 The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [*the log*].

FDP_DAU.1.2 The TSF shall provide [*the (de)configurator*] with the ability to verify evidence of the validity of the indicated information.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: FDP_DAU.1 is present in this PP to make sure that the log file that can be exported from the TOE is authentic and integer. Such functionality can e.g. be implemented by the use of a digital signature. Such a signature would then allow the reviewer to verify that the log file is authentic and integer.

712

713 **6.4.1.4 Information flow control policy (FDP_IFC)**714 **6.4.1.4.1 FDP_IFC.2 Complete information flow control**

FDP_IFC.2.1	<p>The TSF shall enforce the [<i>internal information flow control SFP</i>] on [<i>Subjects: TOE modules</i> <i>Information (assets):</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">• <i>choice,</i>• <i>logs,</i>• <i>token data,</i>• <i>configuration data,</i>• <i>ephemeral ballot printer data,</i> <p><i>Operations: any</i>] and all operations that cause that information to flow to and from subjects covered by the SFP.</p>
FDP_IFC.2.2	<p>The TSF shall ensure that all operations that cause any information in the TOE to flow to and from any subject in the TOE are covered by an information flow control SFP.</p>
Hierarchical to:	FDP_IFC.1
Dependencies:	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes

715 **6.4.1.5 Information flow control functions (FDP_IFF)**716 **6.4.1.5.1 FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes**

FDP_IFF.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*internal information flow control SFP*] based on the following types of subject and information security attributes: [*subjects and information according to FDP_IFC.2.1 and the following security attribute*]:

- *necessity to transfer the asset to other TOE modules*

].

FDP_IFF.1.2 The TSF shall permit an information flow between a controlled subject and controlled information via a controlled operation if the following rules hold: [

Any information listed in FDP_IFC.2.1 shall only be transferred between those TOE modules that actually need to process the information to fulfill their purpose according to the design of the TOE. If at any time such information is part of a larger set of information, TOE modules shall make sure to decompose the larger set and only transfer the necessary information to other TOE modules.

].

FDP_IFF.1.3 The TSF shall enforce ~~the~~ [*no further rules*].

FDP_IFF.1.4 The TSF shall explicitly authorise an information flow based on the following rules: [*none*].

FDP_IFF.1.5 The TSF shall explicitly deny an information flow based on the following rules: [*none*].

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control
FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation

Application Note: FDP_IFC.2 and FDP_IFF.1 are used to express the requirement that the TOE assets shall not be available to all parts of the TOE but only to those parts that make use of it. The restriction on information flow defined in FDP_IFF.1.2 will ensure that. FDP_IFF.1.3, FDP_IFF.1.4 and FDP_IFF.1.5 are not used because there are no further rules necessary to express the requirement. In this case, according to [CC Part 2, chapter F.6], the PP/ST author should specify “none”.

Since the security attribute *necessity to transfer the asset to other TOE modules* is determined during development for each asset and is not configurable, the dependency FMT_MSA.3 of FDP_IFF.1 is not necessary.

TOE modules and their interactions will be described in detail by the developer to fulfil the requirements of ADV_TDS.5. Therefore, the evaluator has all means to verify the correct implementation of this SFP.

During evaluation of aspect ADV_INT.3 the evaluator will also analyze whether the modular design of the TOE is well-structured. A well-structured modular design supports that sensitive information is only present where necessary.

717 **6.4.1.6 Internal TOE transfer (FDP_ITT)**718 **6.4.1.6.1 FDP_ITT.2 Transmission separation by attribute**

FDP_ITT.2.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*ballot printer access SFP or internal information flow control SFP*] to prevent the [disclosure, modification and loss of use] of user data when it is transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE.

FDP_ITT.2.2 The TSF shall separate data controlled by the SFP(s) when transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE, based on the values of the following: [assignment: security attributes that require separation].

Hierarchical to: FDP_ITT.1

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]

719 **6.4.1.6.2 FDP_ITT.4 Attribute-based integrity monitoring**

FDP_ITT.4.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*ballot printer access SFP or internal information flow control SFP*] to monitor user data transmitted between physically-separated parts of the TOE for the following errors: [assignment: integrity errors], based on the following attributes: [assignment: security attributes that require separate transmission channels].

FDP_ITT.4.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [assignment: specify the action to be taken upon integrity error].

Hierarchical to: FDP_ITT.3

Dependencies: [FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control] FDP_ITT.2 Transmission separation by attribute

Application Note: It should be noted that the requirements FDP_ITT.2 and FDP_ITT.4 are dedicated to cases in which the TOE comprises physically separated parts. In cases, where the TOE does not comprise physically separated parts, those requirements shall be considered being fulfilled without any implementation/evidence.

720

721 **6.4.1.7 Residual information protection (FDP_RIP)**722 **6.4.1.7.1 FDP_RIP.2: Full residual information protection**

FDP_RIP.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] **all** objects.

Hierarchical to: FDP_RIP.1

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: Unavailability in the context of this SFR requires that stored data that contains the choice of the voter or parts of the choice shall be securely deleted. That may be accomplished by overwriting the choice of the voter with zeroes or random values or powering-off a component until the data is lost. It then may be possible that traces of vote choices are still in the ballot printer, but it must not be possible, using tools, to recover the vote choices.

Additional aspects of unlinkability and anonymity are addressed in 6.7 “Class FPR: Privacy”.

Please note that this requirements also holds for encrypted information and that wiping the key of encrypted information is not sufficient to fulfill this requirements. Rather, the encrypted information itself will have to be overwritten.

723 **6.4.1.8 Stored data integrity (FDP_SDI)**

724 **6.4.1.8.1 FDP_SDI.2 Stored data integrity monitoring and action**

FDP_SDI.2.1 The TSF shall monitor user data stored in containers controlled by the TSF for [*integrity errors*] on all objects, based on the following attributes: [assignment: *attributes defined by the ST author*].

FDP_SDI.2.2 Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [*switch into the mode “management”*].

Hierarchical to: FDP_SDI.1

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The user data controlled by the TSF (the choice, ephemeral data) must have attributes that enable the TOE to monitor the integrity of this data. The attribute may be a suitable hash value or any other suitable attribute that matches the specification and has to be specified by the ST author in the ST in the last assignment in FDP_SDI.2.1.

725 **6.5 Class FIA: Identification and Authentication**

Application Note: The concept to operate the TOE is based on a procedure that activates the TOE for a specific purpose. This activation uses digital token that are presented to the TOE and are dedicated to a specific role (see Table 13) with a limited functionality and only in dedicated modes. More precisely: Every role has a specific token and is only able to activate the TOE for their specific purpose if the TOE is in a mode where this role is allowed to interact with the TOE. For more details on the access control policy behind this concept please refer to chapter 1.4.8.

Please note that even though the SFRs within this chapter refer to a “user” this does not mean that the identity of the user has to be known by the TOE. Rather, each user is identified by a token and it is sufficient for the TOE to know about the role the user belongs to.

726

727 **6.5.1.1 Authentication failures (FIA_AFL)**

728 **6.5.1.1.1 FIA_AFL.1 Authentication failure handling**

FIA_AFL.1.1 The TSF shall detect when [selection: [assignment: *positive integer number*], an administrator configurable positive integer within[assignment: *range of acceptable values*]] unsuccessful authentication attempts occur related to [assignment: *list of authentication events*].

FIA_AFL.1.2 When the defined number of unsuccessful authentication attempts has been [selection: *met, surpassed*], the TSF shall [assignment: *list of actions*].

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication

Application Note: FIA_AFL.1 is used in this PP to ensure that the authentication functionality is resistant against brute force attacks. It is in the intention of the authors of this PP that the mechanism behind it shall only block the authentication function of the TOE for a certain amount of time after a certain number of unsuccessful attempts occurred. This way it can be ensured that this function cannot be misused to attack the availability of the TOE. However, the concrete assignments in FIA_AFL.1 are left to the specification and ST author as they highly depend on implementation details (such as the speed of the authentication function)

729

730 **6.5.1.2 Token attribute definition (FIA_ATD)**731 **6.5.1.2.1 FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition**

FIA_ATD.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the following list of security attributes belonging to individual users: [*role-id, token-id [assignment: additional security attributes, or none]*].

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: No dependencies.

732 **6.5.1.3 User identification (FIA_UID)**733 **6.5.1.3.1 FIA_UID.2 User identification before any action**

FIA_UID.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully identified before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Hierarchical to: FIA_UID.1

Dependencies: No dependencies

734 **6.5.1.4 User authentication (FIA_UAU)**735 **6.5.1.4.1 FIA_UAU.2 User authentication before any action**

FIA_UAU.2.1 The TSF shall require each user to be successfully authenticated before allowing any other TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user.

Hierarchical to: FIA_UAU.1

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1

736 **6.5.1.5 User-subject binding (FIA_USB)**737 **6.5.1.5.1 FIA_USB.1 User-subject binding**

FIA_USB.1.1 The TSF shall associate the following user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of that user: [*role-id, token-id, current mode* [*assignment: additional security attributes, or none*]].

FIA_USB.1.2 The TSF shall enforce the following rules on the initial association of user security attributes with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [*assignment: rules for the initial association of attributes*].

FIA_USB.1.3 The TSF shall enforce the following rules governing changes to the user security attributes associated with subjects acting on the behalf of users: [*no changes of the security attributes are allowed during a session*].

Hierarchical to: No other components.

Dependencies: FIA_ATD.1

Application Note: The initial rules for the association of attributes to the subjects depend on the concrete implementation. Therefore, the assignment in FIA_USB.1.2 is left to the specification and ST author. In any case it has to be ensured that the binding of attributes happens directly after the user (more precisely: the token of the user) has been identified and authenticated.

738

739 **6.6 Class FMT: Security Management**740 **6.6.1.1 Management of TSF data (FMT_MTD)**741 **6.6.1.1.1 FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data**

FMT_MTD.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [import, export and delete as depicted in Table 13] the [all TSF data] to [*roles that are associated with modes as depicted in Table 13*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1

FMT_SMF.1

Application Note: The TOE shall control access to the TSF data to authorized roles within dedicated modes. This means that the TOE has a predefined mode changes and within each mode only dedicated roles are allowed to manage the TSF data. The assignment of roles to modes is shown in Table 13.

742 **6.6.1.2 Management of security attributes (FMT_MSA)**743 **6.6.1.2.1 FMT_MSA.3: Static attribute initialisation**

FMT_MSA.3.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*ballot printer access SFP*] to provide [*restrictive*] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

FMT_MSA.3.2 The TSF shall allow ~~the~~ [*nobody*] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_MSA.1

FMT_SMR.1

744 **6.6.1.2.2 FMT_MSA.1: Management of security attributes**

FMT_MSA.1.1 The TSF shall enforce the [*ballot printer access SFP*] to restrict the ability to [*modify*] the security attributes [*any security attributes*] to [*no role*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1
FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1

745 **6.6.1.2.3 FMT_MSA.2 Secure security attributes**

FMT_MSA.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for [*all security attributes and TSF data*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FDP_ACC.1
FMT_MSA.1
FMT_SMR.1

Application Note: The TOE shall ensure that only secure values are accepted for all security attributes. This is specifically (but not only) the case for all data that is imported from outside the scope of control of the TOE.

This requirement specifically applies to the configuration data, token data and the software/firmware updates that must only be accepted and processed by the TOE if the attached signatures can be verified.

It is acknowledged that the possibility of the TOE to ensure that only secure values for TSF data in general are accepted is limited.

746

747 **6.6.1.3 Security management roles (FMT_SMR)**748 **6.6.1.3.1 FMT_SMR.1: Security roles**

FMT_SMR.1.1 The TSF shall maintain the roles [

- *electoral committee,*
- *voter and*
- *(de)configurator*].

FMT_SMR.1.2 The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FIA_UID.1

749 **6.6.1.4 Specification of Management Functions (FMT_SMF)**750 **6.6.1.4.1 FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions**

FMT_SMF.1.1 The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- *activation of a mode of operation (“change mode”)*
- *import election configuration data*
- *export election configuration data*
- *import token data,*
- *import key store configuration data*
- *export token data,*
- *update firmware/software*
- *export log,*
- *erase configuration data and log,*
- *export firmware/software*
- *test ballot printer function*
- *perform selftest*
- *print test choice*
- *assign tokens to elections*
- *collect used tokens from ballot printer*
- *inspect details on error messages*
- *enter number of polling station or ballot box number*
- *[assignment: additional management functions, or none]*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: It should be noted that the access to the management functionality as defined in FMT_SMF.1 is restricted to certain administrative roles. The restriction of access is defined in the SFRs of the families FMT_MOF (see below) and the SFRs for access control.

751 **6.6.1.5 Management of functions in TSF (FMT_MOF)**752 **6.6.1.5.1 FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour**

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [modify the behaviour of] the functions [*all management functions*] to [*nobody*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMF.1

753 **6.6.1.5.2 FMT_MOF.1/Mode Management of security functions behaviour for the mode of**
 754 **operation**

FMT_MOF.1.1 The TSF shall restrict the ability to [**change**] the **functions** [*mode of operation*] to [*roles and modes as depicted in Table 13*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FMT_SMR.1
 FMT_SMF.1

Application Note: The mode of operation for the TOE is an essential aspect of the access control policy of the TOE. Therefore, FMT_MOF.1/Mode has been introduced in order to make sure that only users of authorized roles are allowed to change the mode. More details on the restrictions can be found in Table 13.

755 **6.7 Class FPR: Privacy**

756 **6.7.1.1 Anonymity (FPR_ANO)**

757 **6.7.1.1.1 FPR_ANO.2: Anonymity without soliciting information**

FPR_ANO.2.1 The TSF shall ensure that [*all users*] are unable to determine the real user name bound to [*voters*].

FPR_ANO.2.2 The TSF shall provide [*a service for one or more choices for an election*] to [*voters*] without soliciting any reference to the real user name.

Hierarchical to: FPR_ANO.1

Dependencies: No dependencies

758 **6.7.1.2 Unlinkability (FPR_UNL)**

759 **6.7.1.2.1 FPR_UNL.1: Unlinkability**

FPR_UNL.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [*all entities*] are unable to determine whether [*choosing a specific candidate or a specific party or an answers to the referendum question or a blank vote*][~~are is related as follows~~ [*to a dedicated voter*]].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: This SFR expresses that the TOE shall not allow any user to link a voter to their choice(s) or to link (a) choice(s) to a voter.

760 **6.7.1.3 Unobservability (FPR_UNO)**

761 **6.7.1.3.1 FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability**

FPR_UNO.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [*all subjects*] are unable to observe the operation [*all operations*] on [*all objects*] by [*all users*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

762 **6.7.1.3.2 FPR_UNO.3 Unobservability without soliciting information**

FPR_UNO.3.1 The TSF shall provide [*assignment: list of services*] to [*assignment: list of subjects*] without soliciting any reference to [*assignment: privacy related information*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: FPR_UNO.1

763 **6.8 Class FPT: Protection of the TSF**764 **6.8.1.1 TOE emanation (FPT_EMSEC)**765 **6.8.1.1.1 FPT_EMSEC.1: TOE Emanation**

FPT_EMSEC.1.1 The TOE shall not emit [after starting up Electromagnetic emanations, Power consumption, Sound, Heat, [*assignment: other forms of emanations or none*]] in excess of [SDIP-27/1 Level A, any fluctuations in power consumption, any fluctuations in sound except emitted from a switched on head phone, any fluctuations in heat emitted, [*assignment: limits for additional emanations or none*]] enabling access to [all TSF data] and [any user data].

FPT_EMSEC.1.2 The TSF shall ensure [all roles that are not in their dedicated role within the correct mode] are unable to use the following interface [all interfaces] to gain access to [all TSF data] and [all types of user data].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No other components

Application Note: The ST author shall consider the corresponding functional specification for the ballot printer when completing the assignments in FPT_EMSEC.1, for example for the emission of light.

766 **6.8.1.2 TSF physical protection (FPT_PHP)**767 **6.8.1.2.1 FPT_PHP.2: Notification of physical attack**

FPT_PHP.2.1 The TSF shall provide unambiguous detection of physical tampering that might compromise the TSF.

FPT_PHP.2.2 The TSF shall provide the capability to determine whether physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

FPT_PHP.2.3 For [*the ballot printer and its casing*], the TSF shall monitor the devices ~~and elements~~ and notify [*all roles*] when physical tampering with the TSF's devices or TSF's elements has occurred.

Hierarchical to: FPT_PHP.1

Dependencies: FMT_MOF.1

Application Note: Based on the assumption that neither the voter nor the electoral committee is not trained in the detection of tampering, the self-protection mechanism of the TOE will detect intrusion and switch the TOE automatically into the mode “management”. The (de)configurator is allowed to export logs, configuration data, token data and firmware/software of the TOE for investigation

768 **6.8.1.2.2 FPT_PHP.3: Resistance to physical attack**

FPT_PHP.3.1 The TSF shall resist [

- *physical tampering attacks*
- *[assignment: physical tampering scenarios or none]*

to the [*casing of the TOE [assignment: list of TSF elements or none]*] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

769 **6.8.1.3 Trusted recovery (FPT_RCV)**

770 **6.8.1.3.1 FPT_RCV.4 Function recovery**

FPT_RCV.1.1 The TSF shall ensure that [*all functions*] have the property that the function either completes successfully, or for the indicated failure scenarios, recovers to a consistent and secure state.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: Secure state in this context means that the TOE shall restart the current process from the beginning. This includes that it shall delete data that contain the choice of the voter or parts of the choice that has been entered up to the time when the failure occurs as required in FDP_RIP.2. For the case that a function recovery in this sense is not possible the TOE shall fall to its mode “management”. In this way it can be ensured that the TOE never operates within an undefined state.

771 **6.8.1.4 TSF self test (FPT_TST)**772 **6.8.1.4.1 FPT_TST.1: TSF testing**

FPT_TST.1.1 The TSF shall run a suite of self tests [*during initial start-up, periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorised user, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur or none]*] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

FPT_TST.1.2 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [

- logs.
- configuration data.
- token data.
- software/firmware of the TOE
- [assignment: parts of the TOE or none]].

FPT_TST.1.3 The TSF shall provide authorised users with the capability to verify the integrity of [

- *the internal hardware,*
- *the internal software/firmware,*
- *the printing unit,*
- *the casing,*
- *the interfaces,*
- [assignment: parts of TSF or none]].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The verification of the integrity of software/firmware may be implemented in software or hardware like a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This implementation is part of the TOE and therefore part of the evaluation of the TOE. Verification of software/firmware relies on the integrity of the hardware. Therefore the mechanism of verifying the integrity of the hardware needs to be reliable and trustworthy.

773 **6.8.1.5 Fail secure (FPT_FLS)**774 **6.8.1.5.1 FPT_FLS.1: Failure with preservation of secure state**

FPT_FLS.1.1 The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [

- *the self-test detects an error or manipulation,*
- *the self-protection detects a manipulation*
- [assignment, other failures to be defined by the ST author]].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The secure state mentioned in the SFR FPT_FLS.1 refers to the mode “management” within the life-cycle model.

775 **6.8.1.6 Time stamps (FPT_STM)**776 **6.8.1.6.1 FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps**

FPT_STM.1.1 The TSF shall be able to provide reliable time stamps.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

777 **6.9 Class FRU: Resource utilisation**778 **6.9.1.1 Fault tolerance (FRU_FLT)**779 **6.9.1.1.1 FRU_FLT.2 Limited fault tolerance**

FRU_FLT.2.1 The TSF shall ensure the operation of all the TOE's capabilities when the following failures occur: [*assignment: list of type of failures*].

Hierarchical to: FRU_FLT.1

Dependencies: FPT_FLS.1

780 **6.10 Class FTA: TOE access**781 **6.10.1.1 Session locking and termination (FTA_SSL)**782 **6.10.1.1.1 FTA_SSL.3 TSF-initiated termination**

FTA_SSL.3.1 The TSF shall terminate an interactive session after a [*assignment: time interval of user inactivity*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The assignment in FTA SSL.3.1 allows specifying the time after which the TOE shall end the session with a user. This time interval highly depends on the concrete implementation of the TOE and is therefore left to the specification and ST author.

783

784 **6.10.1.1.2 FTA_SSL.4 User-initiated termination**

FTA_SSL.4.1 The TSF shall allow user-initiated termination of the user's own interactive session.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

785 **6.10.1.2 TOE access banners (FTA_TAB)**786 **6.10.1.2.1 FTA_TAB.1 Default TOE access banners**

FTA_TAB.1.1 Before establishing a user session, the TSF shall display an advisory warning message regarding unauthorised use of the TOE.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

787 **6.10.1.3 TOE access history (FTA_TAH)**788 **6.10.1.3.1 FTA_TAH.1 TOE access history**

FTA_TAH.1.1 Upon successful session establishment **for a (de)configurator**, the TSF shall display the [date, time, method, location] of the last successful session establishment to the user.

FTA_TAH.1.2 Upon successful session establishment **for a(de)configurator**, the TSF shall display the [date, time, method, location] of the last unsuccessful attempt to session establishment and the number of unsuccessful attempts since the last successful session establishment.

FTA_TAH.1.3 The TSF shall not erase the access history information from the user interface without giving the user an opportunity to review the information.

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The TOE access history only applies to logins of a (de)configurator. Each (de)configurator shall be presented the last successful and unsuccessful login attempts of this administrative role.

789

790 **6.10.1.4 TOE session establishment (FTA_TSE)**791 **6.10.1.4.1 FTA_TSE.1 TOE session establishment**

FTA_TSE.1.1 The TSF shall be able to deny session establishment based on [*the assignment of roles to dedicated modes as outlined in Table 13*].

Hierarchical to: No other components

Dependencies: No dependencies

Application Note: The interaction of the

792

	Electoral committee	Voter	(de)Configurator
Election	X	X	-
Management	X	-	X

Table 14: TSF managing subjects and the modes they have access to the TOE

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794

795 6.11 Security Assurance Requirements for the TOE

796 The minimum Evaluation Assurance Level for this Protection Profile is **EAL 4 augmented** by
 797 **ALC_DVS.2, AVA_VAN.5** and the use of the explicit component **ALC_DEL.2**.

798 The following table lists the assurance components which are therefore applicable to this PP.

799

Assurance Class	Assurance Component
Development	ADV_ARC.1
	ADV_FSP.4
	ADV_IMP.1
	ADV_TDS.3
Guidance documents	AGD_OPE.1
	AGD_PRE.1
Life-cycle support	ALC_CMC.4
	ALC_CMS.4
	ALC_DEL.2
	ALC_DVS.2
	ALC_LCD.1
	ALC_TAT.1
Security Target Evaluation	ASE_CCL.1
	ASE_ECD.1
	ASE_INT.1
	ASE_OBJ.2
	ASE_REQ.2
	ASE_SPD.1

Assurance Class	Assurance Component
	ASE_TSS.1
Tests	ATE_COV.2
	ATE_DPT.1
	ATE_FUN.1
	ATE_IND.2
Vulnerability Assessment	AVA_VAN.5

800

Table 15: Assurance Requirements

801 **6.12 Security Requirements rationale**802 **6.12.1 Security Functional Requirements rationale**803 **6.12.1.1 Fulfilment of the Security Objectives**

804 This chapter proves that the set of security requirements (TOE) is suited to fulfil the security
805 objectives described in chapter 4 and that each SFR can be traced back to the security objectives. At
806 least one security objective exists for each security requirement.

	O.Process	O.Integrity	O.Log	O.Management	O.DataExchange	O.Selfprotection	O.AccessControl
FAU_ARP.1	X					X	
FAU_GEN.1			X				
FAU_GEN.2			X				
FAU_SAA.1						X	
FAU_STG.1			X				
FAU_STG.4			X				
FCS_COP.1		X					
FDP_ACC.2							X
FDP_ACF.1							X
FDP_DAU.1		X	X				
FDP_IFC.2						X	
FDP_IFF.1						X	

	O.Process	O.Integrity	O.Log	O.Management	O.DataExchange	O.Selfprotection	O.AccessControl
FDP_ITT.2						X	
FDP_ITT.4						X	
FDP_RIP.2	X						
FDP_SDI.2		X					
FIA_AFL.1							X
FIA_ATD.1							X
FIA_UAU.2							X
FIA_UID.2							X
FIA_USB.1							X
FMT_MTD.1				X	X		
FMT_MSA.1				X			
FMT_MSA.2						X	
FMT_MSA.3				X			
FMT_SMR.1							X
FMT_MOF.1				X			
FMT_MOF.1/Mode							X
FMT_SME.1				X			
FPR_ANO.2	X						
FPR_UNL.1	X						
FPR_UNO.1	X						
FPR_UNO.3	X						
FPT_EMSEC.1	X						
FPT_PHP.2						X	

	O.Process	O.Integrity	O.Log	O.Management	O.DataExchange	O.Selfprotection	O.AccessControl
FPT_PHP.3						X	
FPT_RCV.4	X						
FPT_TST.1						X	
FPT_FLS.1						X	
FPT_STM.1			X				
FRU_FLT.2						X	
FTA_SSL.3							X
FTA_SSL.4							X
FTA_TAB.1							X
FTA_TAH.1							X
FTA_TSE.1							X

Table 16: Fulfilment of Security Objectives

807

808 The following paragraphs contain more details on this mapping.

809 **6.12.1.1.1 O.Process**

810 O.Process is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 811 • **FDP_RIP.2** ensures that data of the voter becomes securely deleted after the printout and
812 ensures that, using tools, it is not possible to restore the data to leak the choice of the voter.
- 813 • **FPR_ANO.2** ensures that it is not possible to determine the real user name and therefore it
814 ensures that it is not possible to get information about the identity of a voter.
- 815 • **FPR_UNL.1** ensures that it is not possible that any entity may determine whether a user chose
816 a specific candidate. Therefore it ensures that it is not possible to link a choice to a specific
817 voter.
- 818 • **FPR_UNO.1 and FPR_UNO.3** ensure that the TOE is operated in an environment that
819 prevents the operation of the TOE by the user from observation and that the TOE does not
820 solicit any privacy relevant information. Therefore it ensures that the voter is able to cast his
821 choice unobserved.
- 822 • **FPT_EMSEC.1** ensures that TOE data is not observable by leaked information. This ensures
823 the confidentiality of the voters choice.
- 824 • **FPT_RCV.4** ensures that the TOE is able to recover to a secure state in case of power
825 blackout. This ensures that the TOE is able to cover the scenario of power blackout and that it
826 is not possible to gain any data of the use before the power blackout.

- 827 • **FAU_ARP.1** ensures that any user is informed in case of potential security violation and
828 therefore can prevent that a voter will use a ballot printer that is potentially manipulated.

829 **6.12.1.1.2 O.Integrity**

830 O.Integrity is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 831 • **FDP_DAU.1** provides the functions to verify integrity and authenticity of the log.
832 • **FDP_SDI.2** ensures that it the integrity of the voter data is monitored and that the ballot
833 printer will change its mode to “management” in case of integrity failures.
834 • **FCS_COP.1** provides the functionality of hashing and verification of digital signatures to
835 verify the integrity of imported data. The hashing and verification of digital signatures allows
836 the detection of any manipulation of the imported and signed data and contributes therefore to
837 the protection of the integrity of this data.

838 It should be noted that the TOE does not contain any SFRs for key management and signing as this
839 must provided by the built-in security module as defined in A.SM.

840 **6.12.1.1.3 O.Log**

841 O.Log is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 842 • **FAU_GEN.1** and **FAU_GEN.2** define that a log file must be generated and define records that
843 shall be audited.
844 • **FAU_STG.1** ensures that the audit records cannot be manipulated and deleted from
845 unauthorised roles and contributes therefore to the availability of the log.
846 • **FAU_STG.4** defines the behaviour if the audit trail is full and ensures that no audit data is lost.
847 • **FDP_DAU.1** provides the functions to verify integrity and authenticity of the log and thus the
848 possibility to ensure that the log has not been manipulated.
849 • **FPT_STM.1** provides the time that can be used by the audit functionality to provide the
850 events with a timestamp. Those timestamps allow the tracing of entities and their actions with
851 the ballot printer

852 **6.12.1.1.4 O.Management**

853 O.Management is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 854 • **FMT_MTD.1** defines the roles that are allowed to manage TSF data and defines the actions
855 those roles are allowed to perform with the TOE. This ensures that the access should be
856 limited to the functionalities for which the role is authorized.
857 • **FMT_MSA.1** ensures that no role should be able to change the security attributes and can
858 cause vulnerabilities of the TOE due to configuration errors or attacks.
859 • **FMT_MSA.3** defines the initialization attributes and that no role should be able to change the
860 default values. This ensures that the TOE always uses valid default values on its start-up.
861 • **FMT_MOF.1** ensures that a role cannot change the behaviour of security functions. Similar to
862 FMT_MSA.1 this should ensure that misconfiguration do not lead to any vulnerabilities of the
863 TOE.
864 • **FMT_SMF.1** defines the management functions that the TOE shall provide. This ensures that
865 the TOE does not provide any functionality that is not necessary and could lead to a lack of
866 security.

867 **6.12.1.1.5 O.DataExchange**

868 O.DataExchange is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 869 • **FMT_MTD.1** defines the roles that are allowed execute data exchange. This ensures that only
870 allowed roles are able to import or export data and prevents that other roles may use this
871 functionality to import/export data.

872 6.12.1.1.6 O.Selfprotection

873 O.Selfprotection is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 874 • **FAU_ARP.1** ensures that the TOE notifies the user if it detects a security violation. This
875 should ensure that the user is informed in case of a potential security violation.
- 876 • **FAU_SAA.1** requires that the TOE is able to analyze its audited events and should therefore
877 be capable to detect a potential security violation based on these records.
- 878 • **FDP_ITT.2** and **FDP_ITT.4** ensure secure handling of data when transmitted between
879 physically separated parts of the TOE.
- 880 • **FMT_MSA.2** ensures the acceptance of secure values. This is specifically relevant when data
881 is imported from outside the scope of control of the TOE and therewith adds to the self
882 protection capabilities as required by this objective.
- 883 • **FPT_PHP.2** defines the requirements for the physical protection that the TOE must provide
884 and the behaviour of the TOE if it detects tampering. This should ensure that a physical
885 tampering attack to the TOE its hardware and its casing will lead to an action defined in
886 FAU_PHP.3 and FAU_ARP.1.
- 887 • **FPT_PHP.3** defines an automated response to tampering scenarios. This should ensure that
888 the TOE will be able to react in an adequate manner if it detects physical tampering attacks
- 889 • **FPT_TST.1** defines allowed self-testing functionality to check the correct working of the
890 TOE. Such a self-test should be able to detect manipulation of hardware, software, data, the
891 connection of fake devices and the manipulation of the power supply.
- 892 • **FPT_RCV.4** requires that the TOE is able to cope with unexpected power blackouts. This
893 ensures that the manipulation of the power supply cannot lead to successful attacks.
- 894 • **FPT_FLS.1** defines that in case of errors or tampering the TOE will switch to a secure state
895 (the mode to “management”).
- 896 • **FRU_FLT.2** ensures that the TOE can react in tolerance to a number of well-defined error
897 states. This enhances the self-protection capabilities of the TOE.
- 898 • **FDP_IFC.2** and **FDP_IFF.1** ensure that sensitive information is only transferred between
899 those parts of the TOE that actually need it. This helps to protect the TOE against attacks that
900 try to recover sensitive information.

901 6.12.1.1.7 O.AccessControl

902 O.AccessControl is met by a combination of the following SFRs:

- 903 • **FDP_ACC.2** and **FDP_ACF.1** define the ballot printer access SFP. This SFP ensures that only
904 the defined roles within dedicated modes should have access to the TOE and to the
905 functionality.
- 906 • **FIA_ATD.1** defines the security attributes to be assigned to a token. These attributes are
907 necessary to implement the access policies of roles to functions of the TOE.
- 908 • **FIA_AFL.1** ensures that the authentication mechanism should be protected against brute force
909 attacks.
- 910 • **FIA_UAU.2** and **FIA_UID.2** requires that every entity must be successfully authenticated
911 and identified before that entity can perform an action with the TOE. This should ensure that
912 an entity is not able to perform an action without permission.
- 913 • **FIA_USB.1** defines the mapping between security attributes and subjects to enforce the access
914 SFP.
- 915 • **FMT_SMR.1** defines the security roles used by the TOE.
- 916 • **FTA_SSL.3**, **FTA_SSL.4** and **FTA_TSE.1** require and define a session based access control
917 that is used to grant access to the TOE.
- 918 • **FMT_MOF.1/Mode** ensures that changing the mode of operation is limited to certain roles
919 and based on the current mode.

- 920 • **FTA_TAB.1** ensures that the TOE presents the user with the access banners that are defined in
921 O.AccessControl.
- 922 • **FTA_TAH.1** ensures that the TOE presents the (de)configurator with information about their
923 last successful and unsuccessful login attempts after they successfully logged in.

924 **6.12.1.2 Fulfilment of the dependencies**

925 The following table summarises all TOE functional requirements dependencies of this PP and
926 demonstrates that they are fulfilled.

927

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
FAU_ARP.1	FAU_SAA.1 Potential violation analysis	FAU_SAA.1
FAU_GEN.1	FPT_STM.1 Reliable time stamps	FPT_STM.1
FAU_GEN.2	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1
	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1
FAU_SAA.1	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.1	FAU_GEN.1 Audit data generation	FAU_GEN.1
FAU_STG.4	FAU_STG.1 Protected audit trail storage	FAU_STG.1
FDP_COP.1	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation	No component Justification: FDP_COP.1 is used to require hashing. Hashing needs none of the dependencies.
FDP_ACC.2	FDP_ACF.1 Security attribute based access control	FDP_ACF.1
FDP_IFC.2	FDP_IFF.1 Simple security attributes	FDP_IFF.1
FDP_IFF.1	FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control	FDP_IFC.2
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	No component. Justification: The information flow control policy specified in FDP_IFF.1 and FDP_IFC.2 does not require to manage any security attributes.
FDP_ITT.2	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	Both (depending on the implementation)
FDP_ITT.4	[FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control, or FDP_IFC.1 Subset information flow control]	FDP_ACC.1 and FDP_IFC.2

SFR	Dependencies	Fulfilled by
	FDP_ITT.2 Transmission separation by attribute	(depending on the implementation), FDP_ITT.2
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACC.2
	FMT_MSA.3 Static attribute initialisation	FMT_MSA.3
FIA_AFL.1	FIA_UAU.1 Timing of authentication	FIA_UAU.2
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.2
FIA_USB.1	FIA_ATD.1 User attribute definition	FIA_ATD.1
FMT_MTD.1	FMT_MTD.1 Management of TSF data	FMT_MTD.1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.1	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACC.2
	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_MSA.2	FDP_ACC.1 Subset access control	FDP_ACC.2
	FMT_MSA.1 Management of security attributes	FMT_MSA.1
	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1 Timing of identification	FIA_UID.1
FMT_MOF.1	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
FMT_MOF.1/Mode	FMT_SMR.1 Security roles	FMT_SMR.1
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions	FMT_SMF.1
FRU_FLT.2	FPT_FLS.1 Failure with preservation of secure state	FPT_FLS.1
FPR_UNO.3	FPR_UNO.1 Unobservability	FPR_UNO.1
FPT_PHP.2	FMT_MOF.1 Management of security functions behaviour	FMT_MOF.1

928

Table 17: SFR Dependencies

929 **6.12.2 Security Assurance Requirements rationale**930 **6.12.2.1 Justification for selection of assurance level**

931 EAL4 permits a developer to maximise assurance gained from positive security engineering based on

932 good commercial development practices. EAL4 is the highest level at which it is likely to be
933 economically feasible to retrofit to an existing product line. It is also the highest assurance level that
934 enables the use of standard components (hardware and software). EAL4 is applicable in those
935 circumstances where developers or users require a moderate to high level of independently assured
936 security in conventional commodity TOEs, and there is willingness to incur some additional security-
937 specific engineering costs.

938 An EAL4 evaluation provides, in addition to EAL3, an analysis supported by a complete interface
939 specification, a description of the basic modular design of the TOE, and a subset of the
940 implementation. Testing is supported by a vulnerability analysis (also using the implementation
941 representation), demonstrating resistance to penetration attackers with an Enhanced-Basic attack
942 potential. Assurance is also provided through additional automated configuration management.

943 In addition to the measures that are included in the EAL4 package, three further components have
944 been chosen in order to address dedicated aspects:

945 The assurance component ALC_DVS.2 provides evidence that security measures implement sufficient
946 protection. This component will help assuring that security requirements are addressed in the design.

947 The explicit assurance component ALC_DEL.2 has been designed and selected in order to express a
948 certain need in the context of the development and production of the ballot printer. In standard
949 evaluations it falls into the responsibility of the developer to ensure that each instance of the TOE that
950 is produced matches the requirements from the specification and evaluation. In the context of the
951 development of the criteria for the ballot printer it became evident that this would not be sufficient in
952 this context. Rather, a need has been identified that each instance of the TOE is checked after
953 production in order to ensure that it needs the criteria. While this assurance requirement represents a
954 significant effort it has been found that this is the only way to ensure that each and every ballot printer
955 that is used is secure and meets the requirements.

956 The augmentation by AVA_VAN.5 has been chosen to provide confidence that the TOE will resist
957 sophisticated attacks.

958 **6.12.2.2 Dependencies of assurance components**

959 The dependencies of the assurance requirements taken from EAL 4 are fulfilled automatically. The
960 augmentation by ALC_DEL.2, ALC_DVS.2 and AVA_VAN.5 does not introduce additional assurance
961 components that are not contained in EAL 4.

962

963 **7 Appendix**964 **7.1 Glossary**

Authenticity	Property that an entity is what it claims to be.
Authority for investigation	See chapter 3.1
Ballot paper	Special paper that is used to print the choices.
Ballot printer reviewer	See chapter 3.1
Choice	See chapter 3.2
Confidentiality	The property that information is not made available or disclosed to unauthorised individuals, entities, or processes.
Configuration data	See chapter 3.2
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
Electoral committee	See chapter 3.1
Ephemeral vote printer data	See chapter 3.2
Integrity	Property that sensitive data has not been modified or deleted in an unauthorised and undetected manner.
Logs	See chapter 3.2
Maintenance authority	See chapter 3.1
TOE	Target of Evaluation -set of software, firmware and/or hardware possibly
Token	In this context a hardware component that is used to switch between the modes and to activate the TOE.
Token data	See chapter 3.2
Voter	See chapter 3.1

965

966

967

968 **7.2 References**

- [CC] Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation –
- Part 1: Introduction and general model, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4
 - Part 2: Security functional requirements, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4
 - Part 3: Security assurance requirements, dated September 2012, version 3.1, Revision 4
- [PP-MRTD EAC] Protection Profile — Machine Readable Travel Document with ICAO Application, Extended Access Control (PP-MRTD EAC)
- [PP_AM] PP for the authentication module, equivalent to one of the following:
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device with key generation (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01)
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import (BSI-CC-PP-0075)
- [PP_SM] PP for the internal security module, equivalent to one of the following:
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 2: Device with key generation (BSI-CC-PP-0059-2009-MA-01)
Protection profiles for secure signature creation device — Part 3: Device with key import (BSI-CC-PP-0075)

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